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This thesis aims to explain the outcome of the WTO dispute on cotton subsidies between 
Brazil and US by analysing possible factors for the change in US policy vis-à-vis Brazil in the 
case. Brazil challenged US cotton subsidies through WTO dispute settlement in 2002, and the 
process has been running since, with a preliminary stop in June 2010. The WTO dispute 
settlement body issued two sets of recommendations in the case: One in 2005, after the first 
treatment of the case, and one in 2008 after the second. This essay attempts to explain why 
US changed their policy from after the first to after the second report.  
The essay concludes that the Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation was necessary for the change 
of US policy. However, more factors contributed to the outcome. The situation of the US 
economy, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis, enhanced the effect of the 
sanctions significantly. The cross-retaliation threat thus opened up a window of opportunity.  
The changed bilateral power relationship between US and Brazil was an important factor, as 
Brazil became a relatively more powerful actor. The role of the domestic ratification 
procedures in US played in, particularly in explaining why Brazil accepted the lack of full US 
compliance. Also, the relative strength of different US lobbies changed the US domestic 







AB: Appellate Body  
AoA: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
ASCM: The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  
C4: Cotton 4, the four West-African cotton-exporting nations Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Benin 
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation, a body under USDA 
CCP: Counter-Cyclical Payments 
DS267: Dispute Settlement 267: United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton 
DSB: Dispute Settlement Body 
DSU: Dispute Settlement Understanding, the WTO agreement that covers dispute settlement. 
In full: the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
EC: European Communities. Previously the official name of the European Union in the WTO. 
GATS: The WTO‘s General Agreement on Trade in Services  
G2: EU and US 
IP: Intellectual Property 
MAS: Mutually Agreed Solution between two parties in a WTO dispute settlement 
TRIPS: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  
US: United States 
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture 
USTR: United States Trade Representative 
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‖We want to show the US that it doesn‘t matter if you are big or small, or how much money 
you have as a nation. We all want to be respected and to be treated fairly‖. 
Luiz Inacio da Silva, President of Brazil, March 10
th
 2010 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute between US and Brazil on upland cotton was 
initiated by Brazil in 2002. Being a major cotton exporter, Brazil argued that the United States 
(US) subsidies on upland cotton were trade-distorting, suppressing cotton prices on the global 
market, and in violation of WTO rules. The case has attracted attention among scholars and 
media for several reasons; it touches upon cotton subsidies, a subject of controversy among 




 tool that 
never before has been used; and one of the outcomes was that the US government today 
actually subsidises Brazilian cotton farmers. Also, it is one of WTO‘s longest-running trade 
disputes, as it has been going on for almost a decade – since 2002. Like Hillary Clinton said: 
―I feel like I have walked into a movie that has been going on for years‖ (Clinton 2010). This 
thesis aims to analyse the factors which can explain the outcome of the dispute, and more 
concretely, the change in the relevant US policy over the dispute‘s life-span. The research 
question I aim to answer in this thesis is:  
What can explain the change in US policy vis-à-vis Brazil in the WTO case on cotton 
subsidies? 
1.1 Research question 
1.1.1. Research question 
Within the field of international trade, the arguably most important set of international 
agreements and rules are organized within the WTO. A central question when studying 
                                                 
1
 I define cross-retaliation as ―a situation where the complaining country retaliates (i.e. suspends concessions or 
other obligations) under a sector or an agreement which has not been violated by the defending country‖ (WTO 
2005.) 
2
 I define retaliation as what WTO refers to as countervailing measures: ―Action taken by the importing country, 





international organizations, is what makes member states comply, and not least, how do you 
deal with non-compliance.  
An important answer to this in WTO is the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It can be 
viewed as the judicial court of WTO. Member countries can challenge other member 
countries in the Dispute Settlement Body
3
 (DSB), given that the former believes that the latter 
has broken WTO law. However, in a case of non-compliance, WTO does now have the 
possibility to by itself impose sanctions against a non-compliant country. In such a case, 
WTO can authorise the right to retaliate to the complaining country, but it is up to this state to 
actually retaliate (WTO 2011a).  
Horlick (2002: 636) argues that the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which is the 
legal text about dispute settlement in the WTO agreement (WTO 1994), is the ―crown jewel 
of the Uruguay Round‖, as it is regarded as having brought something close to judicial order 
to WTO (Horlick 2002: 636). Within the range of international agreements, and compared to 
GATT‘s dispute settlement system in particular, the WTO dispute settlement system is 
viewed as strong. One reason for this is the negative consensus rule in the DSB when 
adopting reports. This means all member states have to agree in order to not adopt a report 
(WTO 1994: Article 17). In general, the system is viewed to be working rather well - most 
disputes are solved rather smoothly; either bilaterally, or by the offending country 
implementing the recommendations from the DSB report (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 93). 
 However there are important exceptions - one being the dispute which is the subject of this 
essay: The Dispute on Upland Cotton (DS267) between US and Brazil.  
The DSB has treated the issue over two sessions, adopting the first Appellate Body
4
 (AB) 
report in 2005, and the second in 2008. The second part of the process was initiated by Brazil 
in 2006, when Brazil requested a compliance panel to examine whether US had complied 
with the recommendations from the report (WTO 2010b). Both the 2005 and the 2008 reports 
concluded by largely agreeing with Brazil‘s complaints. After Brazil got the right to cross-
retaliate against a broad range of US industries, the countries signed an agreement in June 
                                                 
3
 The Dispute Settlement Body is what the WTO General Council is referred to as ―when the WTO General 
Council meets to settle trade disputes‖ (WTOd) 
4
 The Appellate Body is ―an independent seven-person body that considers appeals in WTO disputes. When one 
or more parties to the dispute appeals, the Appellate Body reviews the findings in panel reports‖ (WTOd) 
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2010 in which US vowed to comply with the WTO recommendations, as well as issuing 
considerable economic compensation to Brazilian farmers.
5
 
The possible explanations for the outcome of dispute (DS267) are the subject of this paper. 
Based on the changes in the US response from after the first to after the second report, the 
thesis will analyse how and why relevant US policies changed from after the first to the 
second report, and which factors that may have motivated these changes. 
The research question is: 
 
What can explain the change in US policy vis-à-vis Brazil in the WTO case on cotton 
subsidies? 
I specify this research question with the following points:  
Change refers to the change in US policy between the two time spans defined below. I will 
define this by answering the following additional research question, which I will refer to as 
my background research question, as it constitutes the background for my main research 
question.  
The background research question is: 
What was the change in relevant US policy actions after the 2005 report to after the 2008 
report? 
The background for the relevant US policy actions will be presented in Chapter 2. The 
definition of the change which the background research question asks for, will be discussed 
and answered in Chapter 4. The answer to this background research question constitutes the 
background for my analysis.  
The two time spans suggested in the background research question above are defined as 1) 
from when DSB adopted the AB report on March 21
st
 2005 to the enactment of the US farm 
bill in June 18
th
 2008 and 2) from when DSB adopted the AB report on June 25
th
 2008 to the 
Framework Agreement was reached between US and Brazil on June 17
th
 2010. The analysis 
thus ends with the June 17
th
 2010 Framework Agreement between US and Brazil.  
                                                 
5
 For details on how the dispute settlement system works, see WTOa. 
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I understand some of the most important changes between the two reports as the following: 
When answering the background research question in Chapter 4, I will argue that US went 
further in pleasing Brazil after the 2008 report than after the 2005 report. US went further in 
complying with the DSB recommendations after the 2008 ruling, and promised to comply in 
the 2012 farm bill. It is important to note, however, that US has not to date fully complied 
with DSB‘s recommendations. Notably, the US and Brazil also agreed on some semmingly 
curious policy actions post-2008: US agreed on issuing compensation to Brazil, in the form of 
what can be viewed as a subsidy to Brazilian farmers. Also, US lifted bans on Brazilian beef 
by recognizing an area of Brazil as free of foot- and mouth-disease and other diseases. It 
might seem odd to the reader what this has to do with cotton subsidies, and indeed, I wish to 
analyse the possible explanations for these US actions.  
Another important note is that none of the parties can be declared as the indisputable 
―winner‖ following the outcome after 2008. Both US farmers and Brazilian politicians 
expressed satisfaction with the outcome, while US farm policy reformers and non-Brazilian 
cotton exporters (for instance, West-African cotton producers, whose situation will be 
mentioned below) were dissatisfied. Note also that the focus of this essay is not the legal 
process in the DSB. Rather, I‘m analysing the reasons for why the US changed their policy 
following the reports.  
 
For a reader familiar with the case, the answer to the research question might seem 
straightforward: As Brazil was given the right to cross-retaliate against US goods after the 
2008 report, change in US policy was due to the Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation in 2010, 
could be an intuitive answer. However, in my analysis, I will show that there are many factors 
that may have affected the US policy choices relevant to this case. Several of these factors 
have changed within the time scope of my analysis. A central part of my analysis will be to 
see how the different factors have influenced the process, and how the factors have 
interplayed with the cross-retaliation threat.  
1.1.2. Context 
Despite the uniqueness of the case, I believe my case of study is relevant within a broader 
context. Below I will discuss the following issues that I believe are a part of the context of the 
case on US cotton subsidies: first, the debate on reaching an agreement on agriculture in 
WTO, or more particularly the debate on agricultural subsidies, second, the particular 
5 
 
relevance of trade in cotton (particularly for developing countries), and third, the situation for 
developing countries in the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
1.1.2.1. Agriculture and agricultural subsidies in the WTO 
It is quite a widespread perception among scholars that agriculture in the WTO is a central 
issue for many developing countries (see Schuh 2002). Developed countries‘ protection of the 
agricultural sector, including agricultural subsidies, is a central issue in WTO negotiations. A 
common appeal from developing countries in WTO has been that the richer countries should 
cease the dumping of subsidized products on foreign markets and abandon subsidies that 
distort market prices on the global market for agricultural products. Also, several developing 
countries argue that developed countries should open their markets to agricultural export from 
developing countries (Schuh 2002: 441, Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 275). Also, NGOs 
have argued that the DS267 ruling implied that US as well as EU have used loopholes in the 
system and creative accounting in order to hide dumping of agricultural products on the 
global market (Oxfam 2004:1). 
Disagreement on agriculture is argued to be one of the main obstacles for achieving an 
agreement in the WTO Doha Round (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 21; Hertel and Keeney 
2006). This is despite the fact that agriculture only accounted for 8 percent of world trade in 
2006 (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 12). This can be explained by the possibilities of gains 
which lie within increased trade with agricultural goods. An estimate from 2006 concludes 
that full liberalization in agricultural trade would generate significant gains to developing 
countries and transition economies (Hertel and Keeney 2006: 13, Schuh 2002:435). However, 
according to other scholars (Bureau, Jean and Matthews 2005: 4), such estimates are often 
overrated, as they often don‘t include the factor that full liberalisation can cause developing 
countries to lose the benefits of preferential access to US and EU markets. However, these 
scholars also argue that for several developing countries, in particular middle-income 
countries, liberalisation can be a source of gain (Bureau, Jean and Matthews 2005: 4). The 
US-Brazil case on upland cotton showed that it is possible to argue in WTO that subsidies in 
rich countries depress global market prices (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 298). The case is 
therefore likely to be of interest for several WTO members who have an interest in removing 




1.1.2.2. The particular importance of cotton in WTO  
In the Doha round, cotton subsidies was early a prominent issue when discussing agriculture. 
This concerned US cotton policy in particular: ―US resistance to making this a priority area 
for reform played an important role in souring the atmosphere‖ (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 
285). The US subsidies on cotton were criticised as having negative spillover effect on other 
cotton producers. The West African cotton producers Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad 
(termed the Cotton 4, or the C4 in the Doha round) have particular interest in this. For 
Burkina Faso, for example, the cotton sector accounts for 75 percent of exports. Sumner 
(2006) estimates that the removal of cotton subsidies can expand Sub-Saharan cotton exports 
with 75 percent. And in the case of removal, by 2015, the developing countries‘ share of 
global cotton exports would rise from 56 to 85 percent. Removing US cotton subsidies would 
―increase household incomes of cotton producers by 2.3 to 8.8 percent, enough to support the 
expenditure on food for one million people in‖ C4, according to one study (Alston, Sumner, 
Buncke, 2007 in Kostecki and Hoekman 2009: 297). The conclusion that removal of cotton 
subsidies can lead to significant gains in developing countries, is supported also by Bureau, 
Jean and Matthews (2005: 4). 
US subsidised its cotton sector with an average amount of USD 3.5 billion per year between 
2000 and 2010 (see paragraph 2.3). If such subsidies encourage greater production and 
exports than the market would request otherwise, it will contribute to lower world market 
prices. This price distorting effect is part of what Brazil challenged, and, as we will see, WTO 
judged this to cause serious prejudice
6
 and adverse effects in the global cotton market 
(Schnepf 2010: 3) 
In 2004 the C4 launched a ―cotton initiative‖ in the Doha negotiations which led to the 
establishment of the Cotton Sub-Committee, and the launching of an official WTO 
communiqué in Hong Kong in 2005, which included promises of subsidies reduction (OECD 
2006, WTOb). The C4 were also third parties in the dispute between US and Brazil (WTO 
2010b). Thus, they have followed the dispute closely throughout the process since Brazil 
launched the case against US cotton subsidies in 2002.  
                                                 
6
 Serious prejudice is a type of adverse effect that a subsidy can cause. WTO explains it as such: ―Serious 
prejudice usually arises as a result of adverse effects (e.g., export displacement) in the market of the subsidizing 
Member or in a third country market. Thus, unlike injury, it can serve as the basis for a complaint related to harm 




1.1.2.3. The DSB and developing countries7 
A common critique of the WTO, for instance from anti-globalisation protesters, has been that 
it favours the richest countries. WTO itself states that equal treatment is an important 
principle for the organization: the non-discrimination principle states that each state should 
treat each other member state equal in trade related matters, unless you are in a customs union 
(Hoekman og Kostecki 2009: 41-42). In addition to this, the consensus principle of WTO 
entails in principle one vote and the right to veto to all the member states (Hoekman og 
Kostecki 2009: 68). Thus, all the member states should in principle be on a level playing 
field. However, this does not remove the importance of asking whether this is a reality: Is a 
state‘s power after all a more important factor when it comes to achieving compliance with 
WTO decisions? And can the DSB can be as useful for developing countries as for developed 
countries? 
 
It has been argued that DS267 showed that developing countries were willing to challenge 
developed countries through the dispute settlement system in WTO (Kostecki and Hoekman 
2009: 298). However, it is important to note when discussing this case in the context of 
developing countries in DSB, that classifying Brazil as a ―developing‖ country is not 
unproblematic. Over the last years, Brazil has frequently been classified as an emerging 
economy, and the country might have as little or much in common with Tanzania as it has 
with Canada. This point will be expanded upon under the discussion about generalisation (see 
1.3) and about the Brazilian economy (see 2.2). Nevertheless, here and in the literature review 
below, I will discuss the role of developing countries in DSB. One reason for why I see this to 
be a relevant part of the context is the ―David/Goliath‖ relationship between Brazil and US. 
The experiences from challenging a stronger country through the dispute settlement 
mechanism can be relevant for more developing countries. I will refer to Brazil as a 
developing country in this thesis, however, with the term‘s limitations in mind. 
One particularly interesting aspect related of the context of this case is what possibilities the 
WTO agreements, and the DSU texts in particular, give developing countries to retaliate in a 
dispute settlement. What possibilities do developing countries have to take a case to the DSB 
                                                 
7
 I define developing country in accordance of the The World Bank‘s understanding, which uses the term 
―developing country‖ for countries that are low-income and middle-income economies. For more details, see 
World Bank‘s website (The World Bank 2011) 
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and see policies change in richer countries as a result? The imbalance between US and 
Brazilian economic power is thus an important element in the analysis. How could Brazil 
which, despite being an emerging economy and rising global power, is so much smaller in 
economic power than US, induce change in the US politics? The experiences from this case 
can be of interest for other countries that want to challenge countries that are stronger than 
them in a WTO dispute settlement. Today‘s system is viewed by some developing countries 
to favour the richest countries, as the retaliation tools are more readily available to them:  
―Developing countries are pushing more vehemently for changes in compliance. They feel the current 
system is unfair because it leaves them with ineffective remedies. For example, it can be 
counterproductive for a small developing country to enact retaliatory tariffs - the sanctions provided for 
in current WTO rules - against a much larger trading partner‖ (ICTSD 2011a).8  
The general success Brazil has had in DSB since its establishment (see 2.1.3) can be of 
interest for other developing countries; as a possible model for how to mobilize legal 
resources in DSB, and thus achieve success when challenging other members, particularly 
developed countries. This is one reason why this case is interesting in a broader context. 
An interesting question is thus whether cross-retaliation can be a useful tool for developing 
countries that challenge richer countries in the DSB. The Brazil-US case on cotton subsidies 
is particularly interesting as threats to retaliate (and cross-retaliate in particular), which we 
saw in this case, are rare: The authorisation to retaliate (or suspend obligations, as it is 
referred to in WTO) has only been sought and authorised
9
 in six cases, in addition to the US-
Subsidies on Upland Cotton case (WTO 2010f). Cross-retaliation has only been requested in 
two other cases than DS267 (namely, the EC-Bananas case (DS27) and the US-Gambling 
case (DS285)), and in both cases the DSB arbitrator found that the conditions for seeking 
cross-retaliation were met. However, in the latter case, the complaining party (Antigua) has 
not to date sought authorisation to retaliate (WTO Enquiries 2011 [e-mail]). Thus the actual 
authority to cross-retaliate has only been issued in one other case than the one under study. 
Also, the case is special due to the fact that the retaliation level authorised is very high – the 
second highest in the history of WTO (Itamaraty 2010).  
                                                 
8
 See also Pauwelyn‘s (2000) discussion about this referred to below, under pt. 2.1. 
9
 In the retaliation process in the WTO DSB, the offended country requests the right to retaliate, and the question 
of whether the conditions necessary for retaliation are met is concluded on by the Arbitrator, before the offended 
country seeks authorisation to actually retaliate. Thus the DSB have found that conditions for retaliation have 
been met in cases in which the offended country has not actually proceeded to seek the right to retaliate.  
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As will be discussed in detail in the literature review below, the patterns of developing 
countries‘ use of DSB demonstrate a quite significant difference between low-income and 
middle-income economies. While the poorest countries are close to absent in WTO dispute 
settlement, certain, developing countries with larger economies are highly active as 
complainants (Evans and Schaffer 2010: 2). 
1.2 Literature review 
In this part, I will review works which have been written on the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. I will focus in particular on how well dispute settlement has worked for 
developing countries, how successful the DSB has been in inducing compliance, how well 
countermeasures have worked, and how the Article 21.5 compliance panel has worked.
10
  
1.2.1 Developing countries in WTO Dispute Settlement  
Several studies have been done on developing countries‘ use of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. As suggested above, a general trend is that least developed countries (LDCs) are 
under-represented, but that, excluding LDCs, developing countries are rather active. It should 
be noted that the definition of the term ―developing country‖ can vary significantly, as the 
same definition is not used in the different studies.
11
 The World Bank typology (The World 
Bank 2011) is the most authoritative one.
12
 
One may expect EU/EC and US to be dominant in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
However, the literature written on this shows a mixed picture. While they have been 
complainants in 41 percent of the cases, they have also been respondents in 40 percent of the 
cases (Evans and Schaffer 2010: 2). This suggests that other countries are not as scared of 
―tackling the giants‖ as sceptics might fear. This is confirmed by a World Bank Report from 
2008 (Horn and Mavroidis 2008) that displayed statistics from the WTO dispute settlement 
system from 1995 to 2006. The report supports Busch and Reinhardt in that LDCs are close to 
completely absent within WTO dispute settlement. Thus, the authors conclude that ―a large 
fraction of the WTO Membership is passive as it comes to the WTO system‖. (Horn and 
                                                 
10
 For background information about the WTO dispute settlement system, see chapter 2, WTOa and WTO 1994. 
11
 For numbers on developing countries in the dispute settlement mechanism, see 2.1.  
12




Mavroidis 2008: 34). However, they also find that countries that are classified as developing, 
and thus more developed than the LDCs, have a ―surprisingly high participation rate (Horn 
and Mavroidis 2008: 34). This is supported by Francois, Horn and Kaunitz (2008: 29 - 30). 
Horn and Mavroidis conclude that a certain portion of the developing countries should be 
looked upon as a significant player in the WTO dispute settlement system. Interestingly, the 
study also adds that G2 (EU and US) are ―less dominant than we would have guessed. It tends 
to be much more often the subject of complaints than a complaining party, and G2 has a very 
low share of all panellists‖ (Horn and Mavroidis 2008: 34). This can suggest that asymmetry 
in size or power does not frighten other countries from targeting stronger states (Hoekman 
and Kostecki 2009: 111).  Busch and Reinhardt (2002: 477), argue that LDCs are 
disadvantaged in the dispute settlement mechanism because they have fewer experts on the 
matters concerned, and are less likely to access legal advice.  
Several case studies have been made on developing countries in WTO (e.g. Bown 2004b, 
Plasai 2006), as well as case studies on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement. 
They include studies on Egypt (Shahin 2006), Pakistan (Latif 2007) and Benin, Burkina Faso 
and Mali (Heinisch 2006).  
1.2.2 Compliance in the dispute settlement system13  
Compliance can be challenging to measure statistically, as a party can regard itself as 
―winning‖ without winning on all cases, as some parts of the dispute might be more important 
than others. Or, a party could wish to be ―losing‖, as this might help them resolve matters 
within their domestic constituency (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 96 - 97). As this case 
shows, a party can claim that it is in compliance, while another party can claim it does not 
comply.  
 
Despite the challenges of measuring compliance, statistical studies on the degree of 
compliance in the WTO dispute settlement process do exist, and the general finding is that 
compliance rates are quite high. In 2005, Davey found that just about 17 percent of the cases 
end up with disagreements about compliance and retaliation requests, while the DSB 
recommendations have been successfully implemented in 83percent of the cases which is 
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1994). For facts on how the dispute settlement process works, seeWTO 1994.  
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included in this calculation (Davey 2005: 47). Of these, several are resolved after some time, 
as resolving often requires domestic legislative changes, which takes time that exceeds the 
WTO time limit. As we will see, DS267 can be an example of this. 
Bjørndal (2009) wrote a master‘s thesis in political science, comparing the dispute settlement 
in GATT and in WTO by analysing the degree of compliance within cases in the two 
mechanisms. Among his findings are that power and the sovereignty of the state remain 
significant factors in trade negotiations in the WTO, that the WTO rules seem to have 
enhanced cooperation, that intentions of future trade policy affect compliance, and that the 
increased legalisation in WTO can be used to convince domestic actors about the need for 
policy change (Bjørndal 2009). 
1.2.3 Retaliation in the dispute settlement system14 
 
Studies on retaliation in DSB show that only five percent of the DSB cases between 1995 and 
2006 led to a request for retaliation. Also, retaliation had per 2008 only been implemented by 
OECD countries - never by a developing country. Hoekman and Kostecki argue that this can 
be because developing countries believe they are unlikely to be able to change the behaviour 
of large nations, and that the costs of retaliation will be too high on their citizens. 
 
Pauwelyn (2000) writes about the challenges of enforcement and countermeasures in the 
dispute settlement system. He argues that the problem of non-compliance is more likely to 
occur in politically sensitive disputes. Also, he argues that economic and political power is an 
important factor when it comes to achieving compliance: weaker member countries that find 
themselves in the face of noncompliance with a stronger member, can find countermeasures 
to be difficult or impossible to impose. (Pauwelyn 2000: 338). There is also the fear that 
retaliation can provoke counter-retaliation in other fields, like aid, or that imposing tariff 
barriers on products from a stronger country can harm local consumers more than it induces 
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Pauwelyn‘s findings are supported by an analysis of trade disputes in GATT/WTO between 
1974 and 1998 that shows that a successful solution of a WTO dispute, is dependent on 
whether the accused party is concerned about the possibility of retaliation (Bown 2004a: 822). 
Busch and Reinhardt argue that if a developing country threatens to retaliate, the threat will 
often not be credible enough. This will decrease the developing country‘s chances to ensure 
change in the policies of the country they have accused. (Busch and Reinhardt 2003: 4). This 
makes it interesting to analyse how the threat of retaliation in this case worked between 
Brazil, which is a developing country, and US. 
 
Another problem with compliance is that often occurs after quite a long time, often several 
years
16
. Also, if there is compensation, it is ―nearly guaranteed to be less costly to the 
defendant than removing the offending measure in the first place‖ (Busch and Reinhardt 
2002:478). And, as mentioned, least developed countries will not be able to make credible 
threats of retaliation. According to this argument, the retaliation system is therefore unlikely 
to deter many violations with WTO law (Busch and Reinhardt 2002: 478).  
 
Horlick (2002) has criticised DSB for breaking with the main aim of WTO. He identifies 
several problems with the WTO compliance system, but the negative effects that of trade 
retaliation, are particularly problematic (Horlick 2002: 637). He points to the only case in 
GATT when retaliation was authorised
17
, and argues that the authorisation of retaliation had 
no influence on the level of compliance. He also says that retaliation often is applied on other 
sectors than those who benefit from the defection from WTO rules, and that it thus is not 
effective as a sanction. And as Charnovitz, he points out that it threatens the fundamental free 
trade principles of WTO, and that it raises costs for the offended member country. This, 
Horlick says, makes retaliation less attractive for weaker countries (Horlick 2002: 641). 
 
However, the strengthened retaliation system of WTO compared to the GATT system, has 
also received praise, and is often described as better than compliance mechanisms in most 
other treaties (Davey 2005  in Jackson 2006:199). The retaliation system and its 
countermeasures are also seen as very powerful within international law (Jackson 2006: 197). 
Some WTO members wish to make the system even more legalised (Hoekman and Kostecki 
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2009:121). The compliance school, which is discussed in chapter 3: Theory, argue that 
retaliatory measures can be necessary (see Downs et al 1996, or Downs and Jones 2002), and 
in the analysis in this thesis I will argue that trade retaliation has been an effective tool for 
enforcement in DS267.  
1.2.4 Cross-retaliation18 
When cross-retaliation has been addressed by scholars, the focus has often been on the 
possibilities for developing countries to use it, and particularly on using it under the 
agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In his study of 
the use of cross-retaliation under TRIPS, Basheer (2009) concludes that for developing 
countries, cross-retaliation is a more effective tool than ―traditional‖ retaliation in most cases. 
He argues that in a case of credible cross-retaliation, developed countries are more likely to 
comply (particularly under disputes concerning the TRIPS agreement). He therefore 
recommends that cross-retaliation should become a ―mainstream retaliatory technique‖ in 
WTO dispute settlement, as this would make more developing countries view the DSB 
framework as relevant (Basheer 2009: 79-80). Spadano (2008) believes cross-retaliation can 
be a feasible tool for developing countries, but only if certain conditions are met (see Spadano 
2008). Subramanian and Watal (2000: 415) are very optimistic about the possibilities of 
cross-retaliation as a tool for developing countries aiming to induce compliance among 
developed countries. Vranes (2003: 128), however, is pessimistic, believing that cross-
retaliation will not make developing countries significantly stronger when sanctioning against 
larger parties.  
1.2.5 The role of Article 21.5 – the compliance panel 
 
The possibility in WTO dispute settlement to request a compliance panel was used by Brazil 
in this case. The 2008 report which I refer to in this thesis is a result of the compliance panel 
process
19
. How does the compliance panel affect dispute settlement? 
The DSU Article 21.5 about the compliance panel is one aspect of WTO dispute settlement 
which has received slightly less attention than other aspects of the DSU, but some research 
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has been done. In an analysis about the disputes which had been through an Article 21.5 
compliance panel, Kearns and Charnovitz (2002) finds that the mechanism has worked as 
intended: Experience suggests that it has been used when it has been needed, and that member 
countries are confident that its findings will be valuable for the process. Kearns and 
Charnovitz conclude that the compliance panel works efficiently and, most importantly, that it 
detects non-compliance (Kearns and Charnovitz 2002: 338 – 339). 
This article is based on a dataset of only twelve cases, as the data is collected in February 
2002 (Kearns and Charnovitz 2002: 338). Since then, several cases have been treated by a 
compliance panel. It would then be interesting to see an analysis on the cases that has been 
treated after 2002. I have not found any work that analyses this, however.  
Nobody else have, as far as I have been able to ascertain, looked at this particular case by 
analysing the change in US policy from after the DSB adoption of the 2005 report to after the 
adoption of the 2008 report. This thesis aims to add to the research which is done on WTO 
dispute settlement. 
1.3 Research design 
1.3.1 Case study method 
This thesis is a single case study with interpretative case study design. In such a design, 
theory is used to interpret the chosen case in light of theory. I believe this is appropriate for 
my thesis, as the aim of the thesis is not to test a theory, but rather to utilize theory in the 
analysis of my case (Andersen 2007 in Bratberg 2010). Also, the main motivation for the 
thesis is that I find the case to be interesting in itself.
20
 
The research question will be addressed by analysing what caused US actions after the report 
in 2005 and the report in 2008. I analyse a process over time and with particular focus on the 
reactions after two separate reports. The unit of analysis is the bilateral relation between US 
and Brazil. The dependent variable that I‘m aiming to explain is the change in US policy 
choices after the 2005 report to after the 2008 report.
21
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 The reasons for why I believe the case is interesting were given under 1.1. 
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  Will be defined in chapter 2 and chapter 4. 
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The case study design may have elements of process tracing, which Gerring defines as ―a 
style of analysis used to reconstruct a causal process that has occurred within a single case‖ 
(Gerring 2007: 216). Process tracing is defined by multiple types of evidence/factors that are 
used to explain one causal outcome, and that the causal factors are quite complex (Gerring 
2007: 216). Process tracing is extremely challenging in terms of gathering all types of 
relevant information. I do not argue that I have gathered all types of evidence relevant for the 
case here, as this probably is a task too big for the scope of this essay. The empirical content 
used here is gathered on the factors that theory (chapter 3) suggests can be relevant for the 
case.  
The analysis will be a two-level game analysis where both countries are represented on each 
one of the levels. The two-level game approach will thus constitute the basic model for my 
research. However, as the focus of the research question is on the implementations of US 
policy/political consequences in the US, I will place more emphasis on the US national level 
than on the Brazilian national level. I have supplied Putnam‘s theory on two-level games with 
other theories (see chapter 3). The theories are chosen on the basis of what I believe could be 
fruitful in order to answer the research question. Due to the limitations of this essay, I have 
therefore included theories that represent factors that may have influenced the change in US 
policy in this particular case, and excluded theories that may be relevant to issues discussed, 
but that I did not view as essential to answer the research question.  
1.3.2 Validity 
The case is chosen due to reasons discussed. There are, however, possible arguments against 
choosing this particular case (DS267). If an aim of the case was to be able to generalise to 
other cases, I would for instance modelled it after a most similar system design model or a 
most different system design model (Landman 2008: 70). However, the main aim of this 
thesis is not generalisation, but interest in the case in itself. Also, as argued under 1.1.2., I 
believe the case can shed light on certain processes that can be of relevance to other cases. 
Note that this case is not ―representative‖ for most dispute settlement cases, as most countries 
comply with the DSB findings most of the time (Hughes 2006: 195). This case, in which US 
has repeatedly been found to be in non-compliance most of the time, is therefore an exception 




from the general trend. However, as the level of compliance is likely to decrease when the 
cost of compliance increases,
22
 cases in which DSB recommendations are costly to implement 
can be said to be of particular interest.
23
 This essay will argue that implementation of the DSB 
findings in DS267 would be costly for US, which makes the case interesting in a discussion of 
compliance.  
The case study is generally seen as having limitations when it comes to the potential of 
generalisation, and thus low external validity. (Gerring 2007: 43). In the case of this thesis, it 
will be difficult to generalise from Brazil‘s case in WTO to other countries. One could, for 
instance, imagine that one could take the factors that made Brazil more or less successful, and 
apply them to other developing countries challenging richer countries through WTO‘s dispute 
settlement mechanism. However, there are several reasons for why such generalisations 
should be difficult. Brazil is in many ways a unique case. It has a unique position in the South 
American region as a leading emerging economy, and the bilateral relationship and 
historically complex links between the two actors in question (US and Brazil) are in many 
ways different from those applying to other states. And as discussed above it can be argued 
that Brazil does not fit into a definition as a ―developing country‖.  
However, the case study is viewed as having high internal validity. In other words, in 
explaining the causal processes in a case, the internal validity increases (Gerring 2007: 43). 
Causal mechanisms are defined as ―independent stable factors that under certain conditions 
link causes to effects‖ (George and Bennett 2004: 8). Being a single case study, this thesis can 
also include far more factors than a large-N study, which strengthens the internal validity.  
Although single case studies are viewed as scoring high on internal validity, the study is 
vulnerable for omitted variable bias, which occurs when key variables that may explain the 
outcome are excluded from the analysis. In this case, an identified factor could be erroneously 
taken as the explanation for the outcome. I cannot exclude the possibility that I have excluded 
key factors from the analysis. I have aimed to minimize the chances for this by basing the 
choice of factors included in the analysis on theoretical considerations. However, this requires 
that my choice of theory is sound and appropriate for my analysis. I can therefore not be 
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certain that relevant variables or relevant theories are not excluded. This may possibly weaken 
the internal validity of the case. 
Including elements of process tracing in the analysis is a way of strengthening inner validity, 
as it aims to identify as many relevant variables as possible. The process tracing method‘s 
focus on thick description, thorough document studies and following the process over time, 
contributes to this. As I include elements of process tracing in the analysis, I hope that this 
strengthens the internal validity of the essay. However, again, I cannot be certain that all 
variables are included.  
It is therefore important to be cautious in suggesting causality between the WTO DSB reports 
and the US actions following the case. It is a challenge to differ between the policy choices 
that were made as direct reactions to the recommendations of the DSB reports, and policy 
choices that were relevant to the process, but that may have been influenced by other factors. 
The policy changes US made after the two reports were not necessarily a direct consequence 
of the reports themselves. My thesis focuses on explaining the relevant US policy choices that 
occurred after the DSB reports. I will attempt to explore the possible causal link between 
report recommendations and policy, but I will be careful to conclude about causality. 
Nevertheless, based on the theories chosen in this thesis, I believe I can suggest certain 
possible explanatory factors for why US changed their actions the way they did, and by this 
answer my research question. 
I have earlier written an essay related to this topic (Stolpestad: 2010). This essay analysed the 
second part of the cotton dispute in terms of Putnam‘s theory of two-level games. However, 
this essay differs significantly from this master thesis, as the scope of the essay was much 
smaller, and the empirical base was narrower. The theoretical framework and the method are 
different in this study. 
1.3.3 Data collection methods 
 
The design contains text and content analysis of primary and secondary sources. Documents 
from WTO, analytical articles, press releases, official statements, articles from the 
governments of Brazil and US and news articles will be among the sources. I base the 
description of the US policy choices and the change between the two report on analysis and 
18 
 
data from WTO and US Congressional Research Service. I have collected the data by 
systematically searching in the databases of the relevant US and Brazilian departments, in 
scholarly articles through databases of academic articles, through institutes that have followed 
the case, and through news search in magazines and newspapers. This has necessitated the use 
of quite a large number of sources, which has made the bibliography of this essay quite 
comprehensive. This has contributed to the length of this thesis. 
I utilise a lot of internet sources. I view this to be a consequence of my research question, 
which specifies that my topic takes place close to present date. Also, I have been critical of 
my sources, assessing the credibility of the different sources as I have collected the data.  
A challenge with this analysis is that the final verdict of the implementation of the 2009 report 
will not be known until 2012, when the US farm bill is to be approved in Congress. I solve 
this by defining the time of analysis as starting with the AB report of 2005, and ending in 
June 2010. The reason for why this date is chosen is derived from my research question, and 
on the fact that Brazil and US agreed on a temporary solution in June 2010.  
1.4 Structure of essay 
 
Chapter 1 is the introduction. 
Chapter 2 presents background for my case.  
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework for my analysis. 
Chapter 4 will define the change between the policy choices after the two reports, and then 
present a theory-based analysis of the data.  
Chapter 5 will conclude.  
19 
 
2 Background  
This chapter will describe the details of the case that I‘m looking at. It will present the main 
conclusions of the 2005 and 2008 AB reports, and the relevant policy choices US made after 
those reports.
24
 The definition of the change in US policy, which my background research 
question asks for, will be found in the beginning of Chapter 4. 
Before presenting the findings of the WTO reports, I will present background information on 
the WTO dispute settlement process, how Brazil previously has fared in the DSB, and in the 
US and Brazilian economy. 
2.1 Dispute settlement in the WTO 
2.1.1 The dispute settlement system25 
 
When GATT was replaced by WTO in 1995, the old dispute settlement system was replaced 
with a new one. The WTO dispute settlement system is generally viewed as stronger in 
several ways: It has negative, not positive consensus (i.e. in order to block a decision, all 
parties must agree), time limits were introduced, an appeal process was implemented, and 
retaliation became easier to authorise (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 91). The elaborate 
enforcement mechanisms of WTO are regarded as highly developed in the context of 
international law, compared to other bodies. WTO settlement procedures are legally binding 
(Pauwelyn 2000: 341) and must be self-enforcing, as the WTO is inter-governmental, and 
there is no supra-national body to ―impose rulings and enforce judgments‖ (Hoekman og 
Kostecki 2009: 85). 
 
The disputes are dealt with by the DSB - which is the name of the WTO general council when 
dealing with dispute settlement. The DSB establishes panels, adopts the reports from these 
panels, can examine the implementations of the panel recommendations, and, if the offending 
country is found to be in noncompliance, authorises retaliatory measures. A country cannot 
take WTO law into its own hands, so to speak, and retaliate without being allowed to do so by 
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the DSB. It must go through the dispute settlement process first (Hoekman and Kostecki 
2009: 88). It should be noted that the only actors that can bring cases to WTO DSB, are 
governments.  
The process starts with an arbitration stage. If this does not lead to a solution within a certain 
time limit, the complaining party can request the establishment of a WTO dispute settlement 
panel. The panel then produces a report, which is adopted by the DSB, if an appeal is not 
requested. If an appeal is requested, an appellate body (AB) goes to work. This report is final, 
and adopted by the DSB (unless there is a consensus among the DSB member not to adopt the 
report). If a complaining party does not believe that the defending party has complied with the 
findings in the panel/AB report, the complaining party can request a compliance panel. If this 
panel finds that the defending party has not complied, the complaining party can request the 
right to retaliate (WTOa). In DS267, the parties went through all these stages.  
The incentives in WTO dispute settlement to comply with WTO rules are described as 
asymmetric. The reason for this is that no other WTO members than the offended party in a 
dispute can retaliate. The country which is entitled the right to retaliate has to carry the cost of 
the legal proceedings as well as the cost of the countermeasures (Pauwelyn 2000: 345). Such 
countermeasures can be costly since they often include raising import barriers, which affect 
the retaliating country‘s consumers. As mentioned, the credibility of the threat of smaller 
countries, will often be low, as raising import barriers is unlikely to have a significant impact 
on the target country. (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 114). A suggestion to counter this 
dilemma is to introduce collective retaliation, e.g. that all WTO members, not only the 
offended party, retaliates against the offending party. By this, weaker members who have won 
a DS case, but who lack the power to retaliate efficiently, will be able to retaliate efficiently 
(Pauwelyn 2000: 345). However, such suggestions have not yet received much support; one 
reason being that it would imply significant intrusion into state sovereignty (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2009: 115). 
The DSU states that cross-retaliation
26
 can be authorised when it is not ―practicable or 
effective‖ for a complaining party to retaliate within the same sector or even within the same 
agreement as the violation has occurred in, cross-retaliation can be requested. How important 
the trade in the sector in question is for the complaining party, and the broader economic 
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consequences of retaliation within that sector, is also taken into account (WTO 1994). This 
means that cross-retaliation can be considered in cases when the complaining country‘s 
economy is significantly smaller than the defending country (like the case often is when a 
developing country is the complainant), when the consumers of that country may be harmed 
by retaliation within one sector or agreement, and when the sector in question is of particular 
importance for that country.  
2.1.2 Brazil and the US in WTO dispute settlement 
 
Brazil has been described as a leading example for developing countries in WTO dispute 
settlement. It is regarded as one of the most successful users of the DSB, both as a plaintiff 
and as a defendant, and compared to both developing and developed countries (Shaffer, 
Sanchez, Rosenberg 2006: 3 - 4). It is the developing country that has issued most complaints 
in the DSB (Evans and Shaffer 2010: 2).  
Brazil has been a complainant in 25 cases, respondent in 14, and a third party in 61 cases 
(WTOe). US on the other hand, has been a complainant in 97 cases, a respondent in 112 cases 
and a third party in 84 cases (WTOf). Thus US has more cases in numbers. However, 
considering the fact the US GDP is almost ten times the size of the Brazilian GDP (see 2.2.), 
Brazil is a relatively more active user of the DSB. Also, notably, Brazil has been a 
complainant more times than she has been a respondent, while the opposite is true for US. 
Brazil is referred to as having achieved great success, having ―largely prevailed in each of its 
complaints, and the settlements that it obtained have been largely to its satisfaction‖, 
according to Schaffer et al (2006: 21).  
The increased legalisation of dispute settlement in the WTO after its establishment in 1995 
increased the demand for legal expertise among countries involved in the dispute. Since the 
establishment of the DSB, Brazil has developed a sophisticated model for dealing dispute 
settlement. It has a specialised WTO dispute settlement unit in the foreign ministry, and 
Brazil‘s mission in Geneva has been expanded. Brazil has mobilised significant legal capacity 
to deal with dispute settlement. This strategy has strengthened Brazil‘s capacity in dispute 
settlement cases (Shaffer, Sanchez, Rosenberg 2006: 5 - 6). I see this as relevant to my 
research question as the cotton subsidies case against US evolved parallel to that Brazil‘s 
commitment to dispute settlement in general increased. This suggests that Brazil 
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demonstrated a strong belief in the dispute settlement system in general during the time period 
in which this case evolved.  
2.2 The economy of US and Brazil in the 2000s 
Brazil is a member of the so-called BRIC group of emerging economies, and over the last 
decade Brazil has emerged as a regional superpower and a leading country on the global 
scene. GDP per capita increased from USD 3766 in 2000 to USD 8237 in 2009, total GDP 
from USD 645 to USD 1577 billion over the same years. In 2009, Brazil was the world‘s 8th 
largest economy. Unemployment rates have also gone down: In August 2007 the rate was 
9,5percent, same month 2010 the number was 6,7percent (MDICE 2010). Brazil has a 
positive trade balance for 2010: The estimated export numbers are USD 199, 7 billion, while 
the import was USD 187.7 billion. Brazil has also experienced increased macroeconomic 
stability since 2003 (CIA 2011). 
Despite GDP decrease in 2009 the country has dealt relatively well with the blow following 
the financial crisis. The real growth in Brazil was -0.2 percent, however the global total 
growth was worse, -0.6 percent. In 2007 and 2008, the country experienced record growth. 
Brazil was hit by the financial crisis in September 2008, and experienced recession in two 
quarters. But after this, Brazil was one of the first countries to recover from the crisis, as 
exports started picking up, and the GDP growth for 2010 turned positive (CIA 2011a). 
With a GDP of USD 14.1 trillion (2009) (IMF 2010), US is the world‘s largest economy, but 
despite still being technologically in the forefront within important sectors, the US advantage 
has narrowed since the Second World War. Throughout the last decade, US has met several 
severe economic challenges. The wars on Iraq and Afghanistan have required a significant 
part of the national resources being shifted to the military. Also, US is highly dependent on 
the global oil marked: of US oil consumption, imported oil accounts for about 60 percent. 
When oil prices soared from 2005 and early 2008, inflation and unemployment was 
threatened. US has also struggled with enormous trade and budget deficits over the last years: 
the trade deficit was USD 840 billion in 2009, USD 506 billion in 2008, and USD 630 billion 
in 2010. The financial crisis hit US hard: in the middle of 2008 US was pushed into a 
recession which lasted until the third quarter of 2009 (CIA 2011b).  
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2.2.1 The bilateral economic relationship between US and Brazil  
USDA tells us that ―agricultural trade between Brazil and the United States exceeds USD 6.2 
billion annually, of which Brazilian exports account for more than 90 percent‖ (USDA 
2010a). And US is indeed important for the Brazilian economy: both as supplier of goods, and 
as buyer of US exports. In 2009, US supplied 16.12 percent of Brazilian imports and bought 
10.2 percent of its exports, which makes US Brazil‘s largest import partner and second export 
partner (China is the largest with 12.49 percent) (CIA 2011a). However, Brazil exports and 
imports a lesser part of its goods to and from US. The most significant decrease is seen in 
share of exports, as the share of Brazilian exports to US decreased from 14 percent in 2008, to 
9.8 percent in 2010 (2010 numbers estimated in September 2010). At the same time, we see a 
significant increase in Brazilian exports to Asia, as well as an increase in imports from Asia 
(MDICE 2010). In 2006, which is the year after the first DSB report, US was an even larger 
Brazilian export partner, buying 17.8 percent of Brazil‘s exports. The imports to Brazil from 
US have also experienced a significant downturn, from 16.2 percent in 2006 (CIA 2007).  
Brazil is far from the largest trading partner of US goods, although it is gaining importance. In 
2009, Brazil was US‘ 11th largest trading partner in total, the 10th largest market for export 
goods, (2,5percent of total exports) and the 16
th
 largest supplier of goods (1,3 percent of total 
US imports) (USTRa; US Census Bureau 2010). In 2006 Brazil was US‘s 13th largest trading 
partner in total (1,6percent of all trade) and the 13
th
 largest export partner (1,9percent of all 
exports)  (U.S. Census bureau 2007).
27
 The data suggests that Brazil is increasing its 
importance as a US trading partner. The 2010 statistics that have been issued to now, suggest 
that Brazil has increased its importance further, as the country now is the 10
th
 largest partner 
when it comes to total trade, and the 8
th
 largest export partner (U.S. Census Bureau 2011).  
2.2.2 Agricultural economy in US and Brazil 
US is the world‘s largest agricultural exporter (USDA). The US agricultural sector is one of, 
if not the, most industrially and technologically advanced agricultural sectors in the world. In 
2008, agriculture in the US accounted for 821 700 jobs (USDL 2010) and for 2010, 
9.2percent of US exports, though only 1.2percent of GDP (CIA 2011b ). Thus the agricultural 
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business is not a dominating part of the US economy, although US is a major agricultural 
player on the global scene.  
US farm policy as it is known today originates from the end of the First World War, when the 
US farming sector entered a deep crisis. In order to counter this, governmental programmes 
aiming to control agricultural supply and prices were launched, with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 initiating ―a new era of direct big government involvement in U.S. 
farms‖ (Paarlberg and Paarlberg 2000: 140). Over the 20th century, agricultural support 
programmes grew increasingly comprehensive, and also, more beneficial for larger farms 
rather than smaller or medium-sized farms (Paarlberg and Paarlberg 2000:143 - 144).  
It has been argued that the extensive farming support programs underscore a US double 
standard of proclaiming the virtues of free trade, but at the same time, advocate protective 
measures for certain sectors – of which, agriculture is a typical example (Hufbauer et.al. 1986: 
2). Following the 2005 report in DS267, researcher Daniel A. Sumner stated that more farm 
programmes could be challenged in WTO, as several of them were in conflict with WTO 
obligations. He further argued that the US agricultural subsidies for 2006 were projected to 
USD26.3 billion, exceeding a WTO limit of USD19.1 billion (Sumner 2005). Following this, 
a USDA economist warned that more trade cases could come as a result of the DS267 case 
(The Farmer 2005b). 
Farming is an essential part of Brazil‘s economy. 2011 is estimated to yield the highest gross 
agricultural revenue in fourteen years; breaking a record which was previously set in 2008 
(Portal Brasil 2011). After US and EU, Brazil is the world‘s third largest agricultural exporter, 
and Brazil accounts for 25 percent of the global food market. Brazil ranks number one in the 
world in production and export of coffee, sugar and frozen concentrate orange juice. It is also 
a major producer and exporter of soybeans, tobacco, beef, poultry, corn, pork and cotton 
(USDA 2010a). 20 percent of the Brazilian labour force works in agriculture (CIA 2011a). 
Farming and cattle rising account for 17 million Brazilian jobs and 42.5 percent of Brazil‘s 
total exports (Portal Brasil 2010). In 2009, agriculture constituted 6.1percent of Brazilian 
GDP (CIA 2011a). This number has been more or less stable for the last decade, varying 
between 5.5percent of GDP in 2006 and 7.4 percent of GDP in 2003 (MDIC 2010). Brazilian 
agriculture has therefore grown significantly in numbers (as Brazilian economy has grown), 
however not in share of the economy. When you include activities like processing and 
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marketing, the Brazilian agrifood sector accounts for as much as 28percent of GDP in 2008
28
 
(USDA 2009). This underlines the vital importance of agriculture for the Brazilian economy. 
Structurally, Brazil‘s agribusiness sector has been becoming more and more technologically 
advanced during the last years (Portal Brasil 2010). However, compared to US, the Brazilian 
agricultural economy still lags behind in industrialisation and technology.   
2.3 The cotton sectors of US and Brazil 
 
In 2009, as the year before, US was the third largest producer of cotton in the world (after 
China and India) and the world‘s largest cotton exporter (NCC 2010). Cotton is one of the 
most important US export crops. The average cash receipts from cotton production between 
1991 and 2008 were USD4.9 billion per year, the export sales USD 2.9 billion per year. US 
cotton production has increased in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, also in relative terms.
 
US 
export reached its highest point until now in 2005 – however, the second highest was in 2010 
(NCC 2011).  
The largest cotton-producing state in US is Texas, which since 1990 has produced about a 
quarter of all US cotton. However, cotton is produced in a stretch of Southern US states, from 
Virginia, through Georgia and westwards to California. In 2002, 17 of these states produced 
cotton for over USD20 million each (Schnepf 2010a: 2-3).  
 
US has increased exports in the past ten years. In the early 1990s, US exported on average 40 
percent of its production. Since 2001, however, US has exported almost 70 percent of its 
production. This accounts for on average 37percent of world cotton trade since 2000, up from 
25percent of the cotton world trade in the 1990s. The average amount of US cotton subsidies 
from 2000 to 2010 was USD 3.5 billion per year
29
, while the average value of the cotton 
production was USD 4.3 billion. Thus, the value of the subsidies added up to more than 80 
percent of the total production. Research suggests that cotton producers receive support more 
routinely than producers of other crops (Schnepf 2010a: 2-4). 
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 The difference between the numbers can probably be accounted for that a lot of the agrifood sector 
service/industrial sector. 
29
 Including cash and non-cash support, the latter including loan repayment write-offs (Schnepf 2010: 4) 
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A different type of US subsidies than the domestic program support, are the export credit 
guarantee programs, which aim to extend credit to and thus facilitate export of US agricultural 
products. In 2002, when Brazil issued the first complaint to the DSB, three such programs 
were under operation.
30
 Economists have estimated the average negative impact on world 
prices, due to cotton subsidies, to be between 6 and 14 percent (Alston, Sumner and Buncke 
2007 quoted in Kostecki and Hoekman 2009: 296). 
 
Brazil is the fifth largest producer of cotton in the world, and the fourth largest exporter.  The 
production increased steadily since 1996 (NCC 2010). Brazilian cotton exports have increased 
sharply in the last decade; 2010 was the largest production year and second largest export 
year for Brazilian cotton ever (NCC 2011), and in 2008 there was exported almost eight times 
as much cotton as in 2000 (NCC 2010). And cotton is estimated to be the best performing 
product of 2011, with an expected increase in the gross production value of 50.1 percent 
(Portal Brasil 2011).  
Although it experienced a drop in 2009 (NCC 2010), this illustrates that cotton exports is 
becoming an increasingly important part of the Brazilian export economy. Brazil is a major 
agricultural exporter, and has thus a strong interest in liberalising global agricultural trade 
(Hoekman and Kostecki 2009: 286). However, it is important to note that cotton is not the 
largest agricultural export of Brazil, and thus not the most important Brazilian crop. In 2009, 
cotton was ―only‖ the 10th largest agricultural commodity of Brazilian agricultural produce, as 
Brazil produced cotton worth USD 1.95 billion (FAO 2009).  
2.4 Brazil’s 2002 claims 
When Brazil first initiated the case, it was with six main claims. The first was that the US 
subsidies were not covered by the ―peace clause‖ 31 in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA). US argued that they were within the limits of the peace clause. The second claim was 
that two types of US direct payments to cotton farmers did not qualify for exemption from the 
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 I will not go into details about these here, suffice to say that Brazil challenged two of them under their 2002 
complaint. 
31
 The peace clause is the ‖provision in Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement saying agricultural subsidies 
committed under the agreement cannot be challenged under other WTO agreements, in particular the Subsidies 
Agreement and GATT. Expired at the end of 2003.‖ (WTOd ) 
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WTO AoA, and that they were trade-distorting. US argued that these subsidies qualified for 
the ―green box‖32. Claim 3 and 4 aimed at two programmes (Step 2 program and US export 
guarantees) which Brazil argued functioned as export subsidies, inconsistent with US WTO 
obligations. US argued that these programmes were consistent with US obligations under 
WTO. The fifth claim was that the US subsidies have caused serious prejudice, by leading to 
significant overproduction (particularly from 1999 to 2002), and thus resulting in an export 
surge of US cotton, this again leading to a decline in world cotton prices. Brazil also argued 
that the subsidies led to an increase of the share of US cotton on the global cotton market, and 
displacement of Brazilian cotton sales in third countries. Brazil calculated the damages to its 
economy to amount to more than USD 600 million in 2001, and further argued that these 
programs would threat serious prejudice in the coming years. US argued that the subsidies 
were within the limits of the WTO obligations, that the increase in US cotton exports are due 
to decline in domestic cotton consumption, and that there are international market forces that 
have contributed more to the drop in global cotton prices than US subsidies. The sixth claim 
Brazil made was arguing that a US Act which eliminated tax liabilities for cotton exporters 
selling to foreign markets constituted an export subsidy (Schnepf 2010: 5 – 12, WTO 2002. 
Except for the last claim, the WTO first dispute settlement panel and the AB largely found 
that Brazil‘s claims were right (Schnepf 2010: 5 – 12). This will be discussed in further detail 
below. 
2.5 The 2005 report 
The 2005 report referred to here is the AB report that was adopted by DSB in 2005. The 
measures at issue were the ―US agricultural ―domestic support‖ measures, export credit 
guarantees and other measures alleged to be export and domestic content subsidies‖ on US 




• The peace clause in the AoA did not cover several of the contested measures. This 
included the domestic support measures for upland cotton (WTO 2010a; Schnepf 
2010: 6) 
                                                 
32
 Green Box is ―domestic support for agriculture that is allowed without limits because it does not distort trade, 
or at most causes minimal distortion.‖ (WTOd) 
33
 For details on what articles the measures were inconsistent with, see Schnepf 2010 and WTO 2010a 
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• The contested direct payments did not qualify for ―green box‖, and should 
therefore be calculated as distorting, and included with other programmes under 
evaluations of whether US has exceeded the ―peace clause‖ (WTO 2010a; Schnepf  
2010: 7). In other words, this boosted the size of the payments supposed to fit 
within the ―peace clause‖, making less room for other commodities. 
• The step 2 payments34 to domestic users as well as to exporters of US upland 
cotton were found to be export subsidies, and were thus prohibited
35
. (WTO 2010a, 
Schnepf 2010: 8) 
• The report also stated that the US export credit guarantee programmes functioned 
as export subsidies, and furthermore that this applied also to other commodities 
covered by this programme. Therefore, they were a violation of the WTO 
agreement
36
. These are thus export subsidies in violation of US WTO 
commitments (WTO 2010a, Schnepf 2010: 9). 
• The following subsidy programmes were challenged for causing serious prejudice: 
marketing loan programme payments, step 2 payments, market loss assistance 
payments and counter-cyclical payments. The 2005 report concluded that all these 
programmes caused significant price suppression on the global market, causing 
serious prejudice to Brazil (WTO 2010a). Considering Brazil‘s claim of future 
threat of serious prejudice, the report concluded that as it demanded that US must 
remove the prohibited subsidies, this future threat would be eliminated (Schnepf 
2010: 11). 
The recommendations from the Appellate Body report: All those programmes identified 
as prohibited subsidies should be withdrawn by the US within July 1
st
 2005. This included the 
export credit guarantees and step 2 payments. About the subsidies that caused serious 
prejudice (frequently referred to as ―actionable subsidies‖)37, the Panel recommended that US 
                                                 
34
 Step 2 Payments: ―One of the three cotton competitiveness provisions intended to keep U.S. cotton 
competitive in domestic and export markets (…) The payments provide a subsidy to U.S. cotton users and 
exporters so that U.S. rather than foreign cotton will be utilized, even when U.S. cotton is higher-priced.‖ 
(Womach 2005: 245) 
35
 Under AoA and ASCM (The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures) 
36
 Under AoA and ASCM 
37
 These subsidies are frequently referred to as ―actionable subsidies‖ and consist of marketing loan provisions 
(loan settlement provisions securing farmers low rates eg when world prices are low (Womach 2005), Step 2 
payments and CCP payments (Counter-Cyclical Program payments) 
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should take ―appropriate steps‖ to remove the adverse effect of them, or withdraw the subsidy 
completely. The deadline for this was September 21
st
 2005 (WTO 2010a, Schnepf 2010: 13; 
Grimmett 2010: 28).  
2.6 The process and the relevant US policy actions 
after the 2005 report 
The main point to be made about the US reactions to the 2005 report is that although certain 
changes were made, the changes were not according to DSB recommendations on most 
points. Below I list relevant changes made in US policy. I will also include Brazilian actions 
relevant to the process. The incidents are listed chronologically. 
On June 30
th
 2005, The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced that 
they would ―institute a temporary fix for its export guarantee programs‖ (Schnepf 2010: 15), 
which made the fee structure on the programs risk-based, responding to a panel finding that 
the previous 1 percent cap on the fees for certain of the programmes
38
 contributed to making 
it a subsidy. By making the fees higher for users of these export guarantee programs, USDA 
aimed to eliminate the subsidy component. The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a 
body under USDA, ―stopped accepting applications for payment guarantees under GSM-103‖ 
(Schnepf 2010: 15). 
By July 1
st
 2005, the prohibited export subsidies should have been removed. As they were 
not, Brazil requested a DSB meeting to consider authorising the right to retaliate against US. 
Brazil sought at this point in time to cross-retaliate (Grimmett 2010: 29). Five days later, on 
July 5
th
 2005, USDA announced that they had started the Congress process of eliminating the 
Step 2 program, removing the 1percent cap on the GSM-102 program fees and eliminating the 
GSM-103 program. The same day, DSB got a notification from Brazil and US saying they 
―had entered into a procedural agreement covering the implementation phase of the dispute‖ 
(Grimmett 2010: 30). Thus they had entered bilateral consultations on how US should 
implement the findings, and Brazil had withdrawn their request for retaliation.  
US did not comply with the AB report‘s demand to change or remove the actionable subsidies 
by September 21
st
 2005. Due to this, Brazil again proposed retaliation. This led to arbitration 
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 This included GSM-102, which is the primary export program, and the most controversial export program. 
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between the two parties, which led to reaffirmation by the US that they would implement the 
DSB recommendations, and again Brazil withdrawing the retaliation request.  
On August 1
st
 2006 US Congress eliminated the Step 2 cotton program (WTO 2010a). Thus 
US met this demand, however delayed. ―At this point the Administration likely felt that 
sufficient program changes had been enacted to fully comply with both the prohibited and 
actionable subsidies portions of the WTO ruling‖ (Schnepf 2010: 16).  
As was shown by the later compliance panel ―US had not fully complied with the March 2005 
WTO ruling‖ (Schnepf 2010: 18). The most important program which was not changed 
according to DSB‘s wishes, was the GSM-102 program, which guaranteed export credits. As 
Brazil rightly claimed later (2006) in their request of a compliance panel, the GSM-102-
prgrams were not revised according to the recommendations of 2005. Thus US had not 
brought this into compliance, despite WTO demands that they did so (Schnepf 2010: 18). In 
2006, Brazil requested a compliance panel. The findings of this panel are discussed under 2.7.  
On June 18
th
 2008, President Bush signed the ―Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008‖ 
(the 2008 farm bill). This was a week before the DSB adopted the compliance panel‘s reports, 
thus I view the relevant actions in the farm bill as relevant for the question of compliance with 
the 2005 report, not with the 2008 report.  
I present here the relevant points in the 2008 farm bill. The GSM-103 and SCGP programs 
were eliminated. The 1 percent cap on fees under GSM-102 was removed. However, the 
GSM-102 program was left intact, and ―counter-cyclical payments and marketing assistance 
loans for cotton and other commodities for the 2008 – 2012 crop years‖ were reauthorized. 
The later findings of the DSB arbitrator, referring to the new counter-cyclical payments and 
market loan provisions, were that ―the Arbitrator compared the 2002 and 2008 farm bills and 
concluded that the replacement of the 2002 provisions with new measures [were] ‗essentially 
the same‘‖ (Grimmett 2010: 36). These programs were as mentioned successfully challenged 
by Brazil as actionable subsidies, and should therefore, according to the DSB 
recommendations, have been removed. Thus, although some changes were made here, the 
2008 farm bill did not comply with DSB recommendations.  
Based on this, I define the most relevant US policy reactions following the DSB 
recommendations of the 2005 report as:  
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 The counter-cyclical payments and marketing assistance (actionable subsidies) were 
reauthorized with the 2008 farm bill, and still trade-distorting, despite US promises 
that they would change these. 
 GSM-102 (the most controversial export subsidy program) was slightly changed, but 
still constituting an export subsidy. 
 The Step 2 program was eliminated – 13 months late. 
 The GSM-103 and SCGP programs were eliminated, but not before 2008, which was 
three years late. 
 
2.7 The 2008 report 
As mentioned, Brazil requested an Article 21.5 Compliance Panel in 2006. The panel was 
established September 28
th
 2006, and the final AB report was adopted June 20
th
 2008 (WTO 
2010a). The compliance panel was established to see whether US had brought policies in 
compliance with the recommendations of the first report adopted by DSB in 2005, or if US 




 The new export credit guarantees, including the controversial GSM-102 programme, 
were illegal export subsidies (WTO 2010a).  
 US ―had failed to comply with the DSB‘s recommendations and rulings‖ (WTO 
2010a). 
 US had ―failed to comply with the DSB‘s recommendations and rulings in that the 
effect of marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments provided to United States 
upland cotton producers was significant price suppression in the world market for 
upland cotton (...), constituting ―present‖ serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil‖ 
(WTO 2010a). 
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 For details on what articles the measures were inconsistent with, see Schnepf 2010 and WTO 2010a 
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In other words: the new export guarantee programmes were in fact working as export 
subsidies and thus illegal under WTO law, and the subsidies to cotton farmers continued to 
lead to suppressed cotton prices on the global market. According to the compliance panel, US 
had therefore not complied. 
On June 20
th
 2008, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report. By this, the DSB requested 
that US should ―bring its measures, found to be inconsistent with the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the SCM Agreement
40
, into conformity with its obligations under those 
agreements‖ (WTO 2010b). US had to change its policy in order to be in compliance, in 
accordance with the findings above.  
2.8 The process and the relevant US policy actions 
after the 2008 report  
On August 25
th
 2008, Brazil requested that arbitration about possible retaliation measures 
(which Brazil first initiated in 2005) should be resumed. In March 2009 Brazil followed up on 
this request by formulating retaliation requests totalling USD 2.5 billion (this was lower than 
the original requests). This included three components: a one-time countermeasure due to the 
delay of the abolishment of the Step 2-programme, an annual retaliation for the GSM-102 
export credit guarantee program, and an annual countermeasure in response to the actionable 
subsidies
41
 (Grimmett 2010: 34). 
Then, on August 31
st
 2009, the WTO arbitrator authorised Brazil to request retaliation. The 
arbitrator granted Brazil the right to request for an amount determined by a certain formula 
(see WTO2009a 121 – 124). The formula did not meet Brazil fully in all its requests. 
However, the possibly most remarkable element was that Brazil was given authorisation to 
request cross-retaliation (Grimmett 2010: 34). The cross-retaliation rights were given if 
certain conditions were met. These conditions were dependent on whether the total level of 
countermeasures that Brazil was entitled to enact exceeded certain thresholds on import of US 
consumer goods. I will not go into the details of the conditions for cross-retaliation here (see 
Grimmett 2010: 35 – 36). However, the logic behind is that it is preferred that Brazil retaliates 
within the area of US consumer goods, but in order to shield Brazilian consumers of certain 
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 SCM Agreement: ASCM 
41
 Marketing loan and countercyclical payments 
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goods from significant economic strain, retaliation within other sectors is allowed when 
retaliation against consumer goods reaches a certain level. 
On November 6
th
 2009 Brazil requested the right to retaliate as described by the Arbitrator. 
November 9
th
 2009 Brazil published a list of 200 US products (mostly consumer and 
agricultural goods) which could be subject to retaliation, i.e. increased tariffs (WTO 2010b). 
Brazil was given the right to retaliate when DSB authorised it November 19
th
 2009 (WTO 
2010b). The same day, US stated the following at a DSB meeting: ―the United States wishes 
to reiterate at the outset that it intends to comply with the DSB‘s recommendations and 
rulings in this dispute. Thus (...) we do not believe that it will be necessary for Brazil to 
exercise that authorisation‖ (United States Mission to the United Nations and other 
International Organizations in Geneva 2009).  
At the same time as Brazil was working on the retaliation request (US fall 2009), USDA 
made administrative changes to its GSM program. On November 17
th
 2009 the CCC 
(Commodity Credit Corporation) and the Foreign Agricultural Service revised the GSM-102 
programme by increasing the fees
42
, aiming for this to make the programme more consistent 
with DSB recommendations (WTO 2010b). 
However, Brazil was clearly not satisfied with these alterations. March 8
th
 2010 Brazil 
notified DSB that it would impose retaliating tariffs on US goods starting April 7
th
. The tariffs 
would be applied through an increase in import duties on US products. This was supplied by a 
list of products, and the suspension corresponded to a total value of USD 591 million. The 
goods included cars, pharmaceutical and medical products, electronics and textiles, among 
several other products (WTO 2010d). However, according to the formula given from the 
arbitrator (see WTO 2009a), the total amount of countermeasures that Brazil was entitled to 
impose for more than this, USD 829.3 million, which exceeded the threshold given by the 
formula. Thus Brazil had the right to cross-retaliate under TRIPS and GATS, and announced 
that they would notify DSB about the details in the cross-retaliation (WTO 2010d). On March 
15
th
 Brazil released a preliminary list of retaliation against patents and IP rights. 
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The retaliation was paused a few weeks after. On April 30
th
 2010 Brazil informed DSB that it 
had postponed the retaliation mentioned above, and that they now were in dialogue with US. 
Countermeasures were postponed until June 21
st
 2010 (WTO 2010e). 
On June 17
th
 2010 Brazil and US agreed on a framework agreement. It was called A 
Framework for a Mutually agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade 
Organization (DS267) and stated the following: 
―The Framework sets out parameters for discussion on a solution with respect to domestic 
support programmes for upland cotton in the United States, as well as a process of joint 
operation reviews as regards export credit guarantees under the GSM-102 programme.  Brazil 
and the United States also agreed to hold consultations not less than four times a year, unless 
they agree otherwise, with the aim of obtaining convergence of views in respect of a solution 
to this dispute.  The Framework also provides that, upon enactment of successor legislation to 
the US Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Brazil and the United States will consult 
with a view to determining whether a mutually agreed solution has been reached. As long as 
the Framework is in effect, Brazil will not impose the countermeasures authorised by the 
DSB.‖ (WTO 2010b) 
The Framework constituted several of the US relevant actions after the 2008 report, agreeing 
on the path towards the next US farm bill: ―The agreement ends with the development of the 
2012 farm bill that would contain mutually agreed-upon outcomes on upland cotton 
provisions, ultimately bringing a dispute settlement‖ (NCC 2011b). The Framework included 
the following relevant points:  
 The framework delayed the trade sanctions until 2012 (ICTSD 2010). 
 The framework also stated that the parties would work towards benchmarks for 
changes on the GSM-102 programme (WTO 2010c).  
 Washington also promised to establish a limit on trade-distorting domestic support 
for US upland cotton, with a level that was going to be ―significantly lower than 
the average annual level of trade-distorting domestic support provided for upland 
cotton in the period MY
43
 1999-2005‖ (WTO 2010c; see also USTR2010). 
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 The Framework also promised annual payments to Brazilian farmers: USD 147,3 
million a year ―in form of a ‗technical assistance fund‘ to help Brazilian farmers‖ 
(ICTSD 2010). This fund was first issued on April 1
st
 2010. It will continue until 
the next US Farm bill is passed or until Brazil and US reach a Mutually Agreed 
Solution on the dispute (USTR 2010). That this is the same amount as the 
retaliation amount WTO approved for US subsidies (Grunwald 2010). 
 Also, on April 16th 2010, US agreed to recognize an area of Brazil (Santa Catarina) 
as free of certain diseases (foot-and-mouth, rinderpest, swine fever), thus lifting 
trade restriction on Brazilian products, including beef (USTR 2010). The point that 
US decided this, which one should have thought would be dependent on non-
political factors, by a political decision, will be discussed in the analysis. 
 The framework agreement set out an outline for how the negotiations will take 
place until the next US Farm Bill. The parties will meet at least four times a year 
to discuss the next bill. The current bill will expire on September 30
th
 2012 
(ICTSD 2010).  
Based on this, I define the main US reactions to the 2008 DSB recommendations as:  
 Easing restrictions on Brazilian products, among them beef, through the 
recognition of Santa Catarina as free of certain diseases. 
 Making modifications on the export-guarantee programme GSM-102. 
 Promising to limit trade-distorting support to US cotton farmers. 
 Issuing an annual payment of 147.3USD million to Brazilian cotton farmers. 






The theoretical framework for this paper will to a large extent be based on Putnam‘s 
analytical model of two-level games. I will first outline the basic assumptions of Putnam‘s 
theory. Then I supplement with other theories. These theories are:  
 elements of public policy theory, particularly about the role of interest groups and 
institutional factors  
 compliance theory, with particular focus on the debate between the management and 
the enforcement school, and the conditions for effective enforcement  
 Bachrach and Baratz‘s theory on power relations  
With this, I create a theoretical framework for my analysis. 
 
3.1 Two-level games 
 
The basis of my theoretical framework is Putnam‘s two-level game theory. He presented his 
theory in the essay ―Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games‖ from 
1988. In this essay, Putnam explains how his theory fits analyses of international negotiations 
particularly well:  
―At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt 
favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the 
international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. (Putnam 1988: 434)‖ 
Within two-level game theory, the realist assumption that states act like unitary actors on the 
international scene does not hold. Rather, domestic policies are thought to influence 
international relations and the other way around. Also, policies that are rational abroad can be 




Putnam divides international negotiations into two stages, or scenes. This illustrates how he 
sees the dynamics of international negotiations. The international scene is referred to as level 
1 and the domestic scene as level 2. At level 1 the negotiators bargain and reach a tentative 
agreement. After this, different constituents at level 2 discuss whether to ratify the agreement 
(Putnam 1988: 436). 
Here we get into what Putnam calls the win-set, which represents the manoeuvring space of 
the countries. The win-set is defined as ―the set of all possible Level 1 agreements that would 
―win‖ – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents – when simply voted up or 
down (Putnam 1988: 437).‖ Thus in order to reach an international agreement, the agreement 
has to be possible to ratify at each country‘s level 2. In other words, an agreement can only be 
reached when the negotiating countries‘ win sets overlap (Putnam 1988: 438). 
The win-sets must then be large enough to overlap in order to reach an agreement. However, 
it can in fact be a bargaining advantage to have a small win-set. This is because a negotiator 
with a large win-set risks being ―pushed around‖ by the other negotiators – his constituencies 
are willing to accept a broad range of policy (Putnam 1988: 440).  The size of your win-set as 
a negotiator is therefore crucial for how strong your position is: your win-set at home must be 
large enough to allow for ratification, but small enough to avoid being pushed around by other 
states‘ negotiators. I will now discuss what decides the size of your win-set. 
Putnam discusses several factors at the domestic level that influence the win-set size. I will 
present those I believe are most relevant in this essay. First, the win-set will be smaller the 
lower the cost of non-agreement is at level 2 (Putnam 1988: 443): if reaching an agreement is 
not very important for your state, the chance to reach an agreement decreases. An element of 
this factor is the relative strength between isolationists (actors favouring state isolation) and 
internationalists (actors favouring international cooperation). The more dependent a state is on 
other states, the more likely is it to have more of the latter. Thus, states that are relatively 
more self-sufficient should be expected to take part in fewer international agreements 
(Putnam 1988: 443). One of the most important actors is likely to be the leader of the state. 
Thus I will also discuss how internationalist he or she is.  
Another factor is the structure of the national government: Governments restricted to one 
single policy are less likely to reach an agreement than more internally divided governments. 
Single-policy governments therefore have smaller win-sets (Putnam 1988: 445). 
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The nature of the issue in question is, of course, of high relevance. The more people affected 
by the issue, the harder will it be to ratify. Thus issues that affect many have smaller issues 
than issues that affect a few. Trade negotiations typically affect a large number of people. 
Also, the more politicized an issue is at level 2, the smaller the win-set (Putnam 1988: 
445).This point is supported by, and expanded on, by theories on interest groups (see below).  
Negotiations involving more than one issue complicate the negotiating process. Different 
domestic groups tend to have different views on the agreement. In such a case, the chief 
negotiator must balance different domestic interests. He will often end up counting votes: how 
many votes are lost versus how many are won dependent on the outcome of the agreement. 
Also, leaders sometimes use an international agreement to get through a domestic reform 
which they would not otherwise get through. This method of using the pressure of an 
international agreement to get policies through at level 2 is known as ―synergistic linkage‖ 
(Putnam 1988: 445 – 447).  
The domestic ratification procedure is an important element of the win-set size. The more 
strict or slow a procedure at level 2 is, the smaller will the win-sets tend to be. The US 
Congressional processes are typical of this: The US chief negotiator can seem to be positive 
to an agreement, but if the agreement needs to be treated by the Congress, his power 
diminishes, decreasing the US win-set. Thus the negotiator can use strict ratification 
procedures at home to increase his bargaining power. The flip-side is, of course, that 
international agreements can be harder to reach (Putnam 1988: 448). Not least, the domestic 
coalition, i.e. who the supporters of the negotiator are, is important. Will the negotiator offend 
his supporters by signing an agreement and what would such an offence cost? If there is a 
high risk of losing a significant number of votes, the negotiator‘s win-set decreases (Putnam 
1988: 458). These factors are discussed further and expanded on by Birkland and Hiscox.  
In my essay I will therefore analyse how important it has been for Brazil and US to reach an 
agreement on the case I‘m discussing, and how the relationship has been between isolationists 
and internationalists. I will also discuss how dependent US and Brazil are on each other. The 
structure of the governments of US and Brazil, and how significant the issue of cotton 
subsidies are in the two constituencies, will be discussed. Also, I will analyse the interplay 
between different interest groups, which I expect to have been of particular importance after 
the Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation. I will also analyse whether the negotiators, in 
particular the US negotiator, has used synergistic linkage, or the need to get acceptance from 
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Congress, in this case. The role of the domestic coalition, particularly in US, will also be 
discussed.  
I will now turn to discussing how factors at the international level, or level 1, affect the win-
set size. A negotiator will always seek to find the perfect size of the win-sets. In general, a 
negotiator would want to maximize the win-set of his opponent. However, as we have seen, 
the motives are more mixed when it comes to your own win-set: A large win-set makes it 
easier to reach an agreement, but a smaller win-set betters your relative bargaining position. 
For example, a negotiator can motivate his own constituency to support a certain position, in 
order to demonstrate commitment to the issue and strengthen his bargaining position. 
―Denouncing unfair trading practices abroad‖ is a typical example of this, according to 
Putnam. However, this can strike back later, as it may be more difficult to ratify the 
agreement at level 2 once it has been reached at level 1 (Putnam 1988: 450). 
In the case of a negotiator wishing to expand the win-set, he can give side-payments to certain 
parts of the constituency – either his own constituency, or the opponent‘s. However, this 
should be used in a way that maximises the cost-effectiveness. Putnam actually uses trade 
retaliation to illustrate this: ―Trade retaliation should be targeted, neither at free-traders, nor at 
confirmed protectionists, but at the uncommitted‖ (Putnam 1988: 450). There is a lot more to 
be said on the effective use of side-payments in the form of retaliation and compliance 
enforcement. This will be expanded upon in the section about compliance theory. 
 
Thus, a negotiator should know both his own and his opponent‘s constituencies well. This 
information, particularly about the opponent‘s constituency, is unlikely to be perfect. A 
negotiator can use the opposing negotiator‘s imperfect information strategically, by 
understating his win-set, making it seem smaller than it is. The ideal strategy then is, 
according to Putnam, to create an impression that your win-set is ―kinky‖. This means that the 
agreement is likely to be ratified, but not if it is altered more in favour of the opponent 
(Putnam 1988: 452 – 453). 
The last issue to be mentioned here is reverberation. Reverberation is what happens when 
governments try to expand each other‘s win-sets. This clearly implies that governments in fact 
are able to act within each other‘s constituencies. A message from state A can influence 
people in state B (Putnam 1988: 454). According to Putnam, reverberation ―is more likely 
among countries with close relations and is probably more frequent in economic than in 
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political-military negotiations‖ (Putnam 1988: 455). I understand reverberation as mainly 
occurring through diplomacy, statements and window-dressing, and not including side-
payments, like trade retaliation. When I discuss reverberation, I will discuss how e.g. 
statements from a political actor in state A can have influenced the constituency in state B. 
Thus the Brazilian threat to retaliate against US will not be discussed under when discussing 
reverberation in the analysis. 
In my analysis, I will discuss to what extent the negotiators have expanded the opponent‘s 
win-sets, and whether and how they have tried to influence the size of their own win-sets, e.g. 
by rallying support among their constituencies. I will also analyse whether and how side-
payments have been used by US and by Brazil, and whether this has been used in a cost-
effective way. I will discuss whether the negotiators have tried to make their win-sets seem 
smaller than they are, and whether the strategy of ―kinky‖ win-sets has been used. I will 
analyse if reverberation has been used strategically, i.e. if US or Brazil have tried to influence 
each other‘s win-sets. 
Putnam‘s theory on two-level games received significant attention after the launch of the 
1988 essay. In 1993, Putnam, Evans and Jacobsen released Double-eged diplomacy. In his 
concluding remarks, Peter Evans supplements Putnam‘s theory of two-level games with some 
notes for future research, based on the case-studies conducted in the book. There were three 
points in particular that modified Putnam‘s theories (Evans in Putnam, Evans and Jacobsen 
1993: 427). 
1. Transnational actors are often not interested in the success of agreements. One should 
look at what kinds of transnational alliances which are likely to increase the 
probability of agreements between states, not assume that all of them do. Thus, one 
should not assume that all transnational actors are aiming for the success of an 
agreement. 
2. ―Hawkish‖ behaviour by a chief negotiator or political leader can be successful, 
depending on the configurations of domestic interest (not that relevant for my essay). 
3. Synergistic linkage can be a source of leverage in order to change domestic policies; 
however, it is rarely a sufficient condition for making this change. Thus synergistic 
linkage can be a source of leverage, but is unlikely to have a large impact in itself. 
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3.2 Public policy theory 
3.2.1 Interest groups 
 
I understand public policy as referring to ―the actions of government and the intentions that 
determine those actions‖ (Cochran in Birkland 2005: 18). Much public policy theory is 
developed in the context of decision-making in the US. Thus, I believe public policy theory 
can supplement the theoretical framework of this essay.  
Interest groups are viewed as central actors in public policy theory, and, indeed, in this essay. 
What decides interest groups‘ power and potential to alter policy? Thomas Birkland (2005) 
argues that one important factor is knowledge, or how much information a group has. Also, 
the more effective the interest group is at channelling information to decision-makers, the 
more defining power do they have. And not least, the amount of money the group have is 
relevant. Both degree of knowledge and money is related to how large the group is, and how 
much resources the organization can mobilize in a policy conflict (Birkland 2005: 82).  
Notably, size is not the only factor when deciding the power of a group. Birkland (2005: 83) 
suggests that business interest groups can be particularly powerful due to the keen interest the 
members have in the issues in question. Thus, if people are directly affected by the change in 
issue, the interest group is likely to be more influential, as the members are investing stronger 
interest in it (Birkland 2005: 83). Also how much people are affected, is (naturally) relevant – 
the stronger an issue affects people, the more motivated will they be to create policy solutions 
that are positive for them (Birkland 2005: 83). I will argue that in my case, the farmers‘ 
organisations in US can be described as large and powerful in this definition.  
If we look specifically on the area of trade policy, theory suggests that actors interested in 
protection are likely to be far louder than actors supporting freer trade. The reason for this is 
that the benefits of a tariff are more concentrated than the costs, which are shared very 
broadly among the rest of the economy. The cost of a tariff will thus not be severely felt by 
individual consumers. Collective action will thus be easier to organise among the 
beneficiaries of a tariff than of those who pay. Agricultural lobbying groups in Japan, Europe 




‗Group coalescence‘ implies that interest groups that originally may have had different focus 
areas can cooperate in certain issues, like when fishermen‘s‘ organisations and environmental 
groups cooperate on marine oil spill issues. Combining their resources, smaller groups can 
achieve more results (Birkland 2005: 122 – 124). This is supported by deSombre‘s (2000) 
‗Baptists and bootleggers‘-analogy This theory supports the idea that strong domestic 
pressure from groups of opposing interest, but with the same aim, can induce powerful 
results.  
 
John Kingdom used the term ‗window of opportunity‘ to explain what happens when different 
factors come together at the same time, creating an opportunity for increased attention on an 
issue, and thus increasing the possibility of changing policies. (Kingdom in Birkland 2005: 
116). 
 
To sum up, ―the likelihood that an issue will rise on the agenda is a function of the issue itself, 
the actors that get involved, institutional relationships, and, often, random social and political 
factors that can be explained but cannot be replicated or predicted‖ (Birkland 2005: 133 – 
134). As I will show later, I will argue that the 2009 situation with the US unemployment 
rates and the financial crisis can have played a particular role for deciding the outcome in my 
case.  
In my analysis, I will discuss the power of interest groups in relation to the following factors: 
degree knowledge, effectiveness/ties with decision makers, and how much money interest 
groups have had. Also, I will discuss to what degree change in this issue would directly affect 
people‘s lives, and the consequences of this.  I will discuss whether group coalescence was 
used as a technique here, and also if this case has included what can be viewed a window of 
opportunity. I will also discuss whether the issue trade protection has aroused interest groups 
proportionally more then others. 
3.2.2 Institutional factors 
The characteristics of a political system for the outcome of public policy are relevant in this 
essay. Here, I will discuss how electoral systems, the rules of policy-making and bureaucracy 
can affect policy.  
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The electoral systems can affect the power of specialized interest groups. Proportional 
representation systems are less likely to induce a lot of power to narrowly defined interest 
groups. The reason for this is that PR systems encourage the making of more cohesive parties 
that appeal to a national constituency. On the other hand, plurality systems, in which 
politicians are elected by the majority of their electoral district, are more likely to be 
responsive to particular and local interests and lobby groups (Hiscox in Ravenhill 2008: 
113).Thus one should expect higher level of trade protection in plurality systems than in 
proportionality systems (Hiscox in Ravenhill 2008: 113).  
The US electoral system is a plurality system. And the system is likely to enhance the power 
of agricultural lobbyists for one more reason: the seats in the US Senate are divided along 
political-geographical lines, and not according to population. Each state gets two seats, 
independent of the number of inhabitants within the state. The relatively scarcely populated 
farming regions of US are thus likely to get more power in legislative chambers like the 
Senate than in the House of Representatives, in which seats are divided according to the 
number of voters in each state (Hiscox in Ravenhill 2008: 114). One should thus expect the 
interest of farmers to be more strongly represented in the Senate than in Congress. 
Policy-making rules are also a relevant factor here. The farm bill, as other bills, must be 
passed in the House and Senate, and receive the president‘s signature. If changes are to be 
made in the US budget, this must also be passed in both Houses, but does not need the 
signature from the president (The Library of Congress).  
In terms of international trade, the fast-track authority of the president, also known as the 
trade promotion authority, is particularly relevant. This means that the president has particular 
authority when it comes to negotiating reciprocal reductions in trade barriers with other states. 
After negotiation, the Congress can approve or disapprove the agreement, but not amend it. 
The fast-track authority act was in use from 1975 to 1994, and from 2002 to 2007 (Dauster 
2007, Hiscox in Ravenhill 2008: 115 – 116).  
However, the president‘s party affiliation will also affect his decisions. The preferences of a 
party are dependent on the preferences of its electoral base, which influences the president. 
The relevance of party colour in this case will be discussed in the analysis.  
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Bureaucratic capture is what happens when the bureaucracy of a department, through the 
bureaucratic independence of the party, can develop a close relationship with the sector which 
their department is linked to - and assigned to regulate. One example of this may be 
agriculture - in fact, the Department of Agriculture is cited as a typical example of this, 
regarded as an advocate of protection of US farmers (Hiscox in Ravenhill 2008: 118). 
In my analysis, I will argue that US farmers‘ lobbies have quite intertwined ties with the US 
legislatures and bureaucracy. This will lead us to expect that removing tariffs on agriculture is 
likely to be difficult in the US political climate. 
In my analysis, I will discuss what role the electoral system can have played in order to affect 
the power of interest groups, the agricultural lobby and others. I will also discuss whether 
policy-making rules and the president‘s party colour has played in, and whether bureaucratic 
capture has been an issue. 
3.3 Compliance theory 
 
As noted above, Putnam mentions side-payments as an important tool for international 
negotiators. Compliance enforcement, like trade retaliation, is listed by Putnam as one 
example of such side-payments. Compliance theory examines the factors which affect degree 
of compliance. In this essay, I argue that enforcement was necessary. I will discuss the 
efficiency and credibility of the enforcement mechanisms used in the DS267 case. Here I 
present the management school, the compliance school, and the factors needed for effective 
enforcement. 
3.3.1 The management school 
The management school argues that states in general do comply with international 
agreements, and that there is therefore not a huge need for enforcement mechanisms. One 
important reason for this is that reputation has an important role for deciding state actions, and 
states do not wish to have a reputation as a non-complier, as this can be a disadvantage in 
later international negotiations (Chayes and Chayes 1993). ―Sanctioning authority is rarely 
granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used‖ (Chayes 
and Chayes 1995: 32 – 33). The Chayeses thus argue that sanctions are not decisive for 
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compliance. Rather, states comply due to the following factors: it is in general economically 
effective to comply with the international commitment (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 179). 
Second, the state enters an agreement out of self-interest, and is unlikely to enter an 
agreement which it does not see it in their interest to comply with (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 
184). And third, states, ―like other subjects of legal rules, operate under a sense of obligation 
to conform their conduct to governing norms‖ (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 187). Here the point 
of reputation plays in: hostile reactions due to non-compliance can jeopardize possible future 
agreements (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 186). Also, the management school argues non-
compliance can be due to inaccurate language and ambiguity in international agreements 
(Chayes and Chayes 1993: 188 – 189). 
Thus, in the management school, states tend to comply with treaties. Reputation is a decisive 
factor in state commitments to international treaties. Enforcement, like economic sanctions, 
are neither necessary nor desired. And norms play an independent role in inducing states to 
comply; international norms have an independent impact on state behaviour.  
3.3.2 The compliance school 
The compliance school, on the other hand, argues that enforcement is necessary in order to 
offset the possible benefits of not complying. The high compliance rates which Chayes and 
Chayes refer to are due to selection bias: most treaties have shallow commitments, i.e. 
commitments which are not costly to comply with, and states are therefore likely to comply 
anyway (Downs et. al. 1996: 399). The less costly it is to comply; the more likely is it that 
states will comply. Further, in the compliance school, reputation is not as important as 
believed by the managerial school, as states tend to have multiple reputations.  Also, 
reputational consequences are likely to be more severe for weaker than for stronger states. 
Thus stronger states are less dependent on reputation than weaker states, and defection from 
international agreements is likely to be less costly for them. Another factor influencing the 
importance of reputation is the importance of the agreement: The less important an agreement 
is, the less severe are the reputational consequences for a defecting state (Downs and Jones 
2002 111 - 112). Thus, multiple reputations imply that reputations of a state vary between 
issues, arenas, and costs of compliance. This is not to say that reputation is not important at 
all. Rather, it is supposed by the enforcement school to be more important in some 
agreements than others (Downs and Jones 2002: 112). 
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In order for an enforcement system to be effective, these factors should be present: Non-
compliance should be identified quickly. Sanctions should not make compliance more 
difficult. And not least, the compliance enforcement should be sufficiently severe. This means 
that the cost of non-compliance should be larger than the benefit of not complying (Aakre & 
Hovi 2010: 431 – 433, Hovi 2010). 
However, the punitive consequences also need to be credible. This is of vital importance for 
my research question: If Brazil‘s threat to retaliate against US goods after 2008 had any effect 
on US actions the question of whether they were credible is decisive. The credibility increases 
when it is controlled by the regime itself, or by the countries which are hurt by the non-
compliant behaviour. Political influence should be minimised – the retaliation can for instance 
be decided by an expert panel. One should also avoid the need for the cooperation of the 
punished country– the punishment should be independent of the actions of the punished 
country. The countries that comply should not be hurt by the retaliation. Automatic 
punishment also increases the credibility, and the outcome should be pareto-optimal (Aakre 
and Hovi 2010: 437, Hovi 2010). And last, the country which issues the threat should be 
better off if they carry out the threat than if they don‘t (assuming that the deviant country 
changes behaviour). Barrett and Stavins mentions trade between two countries as a typical 
case of international negotiations in which retaliation is likely to be in the interest of the hurt 
country (Barrett and Stavins 2003: 362 – 363). 
I will use these theoretical points to examine how credible and effective the Brazilian threat of 
retaliation against US was. This can in turn shed light on to what degree the enforcement 
system had something to say in this case: I assume that the more credible and effective an 
enforcement system is viewed as by a non-complier, the more likely is it that the threat of 
enforcement had an effect. Thus, if Brazil‘s threat was effective, and viewed as credible by 
US, I expect it to be likely that they played a role in shaping US decisions on policy actions. I 
will also discuss whether reputation is a possible explanatory factor in this case. Following 
the enforcement school‘s line of thought, the real test of states‘ willingness to comply, comes 
when compliance is costly. In chapter 4 I will show that my case is a case in which 
compliance was costly. Therefore, following the enforcement school‘s argument, it is likely 
that reputations will not suffice to make US comply, and enforcement mechanisms are 
needed. Whether this was the case in my case will be discussed.  
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3.4 Decisions and non-decisions  
 
In order to supply the compliance theory above, I will outline the basics of Bachrach and 
Baratz‘s theoretical framework for analysing decision making and compliance, as explained 
in their article ―Decisions and non-decisions‖ (1963). I believe this theory can deepen the 
understanding for whether, and, if so, why the threat of Brazil to retaliate against US had 
effect on US policies. I believe that this theory complements the compliance school theory 
above.  
Bachrach and Baratz address the question of what makes actor B decide to comply or not 
comply with actor A‘s wishes. They argue that while the making of decisions can be due to a 
power-relationship, often it is due to other factors (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 641).  
They define power as being relational, dependent on the relationship between A and B.  
In order for there to be a power relationship between A and B, there must be a conflict 
between the two, B must comply according to what A wants, and B does this ―because he is 
fearful that A will deprive him of a value or values which he, B, regards more highly than 
those which would have been achieved by noncompliance‖ (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 635). 
The latter point, whether one country can threaten to invoke sanctions against another, is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition to power. A has power over B if:  
 B knows what A expects him/her to do 
 The sanction that A threatens with is viewed by B as a deprivation 
 The value of the sanction must be greater by the value of noncompliance 
 B must believe that A will in fact fulfil the sanctions, in the case of noncompliance 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 634) 
As we see, several of these points are parallel to the compliance theory points.  
There can be other reasons than power for why B complies, or things can happen that look 
like power. I will briefly outline these aspects. I will use these terms to discuss whether we 
saw an exercise of power in the Brazil-US case.  
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Force should not be mixed up with power. By use of force, B does not have the possibility of 
a choice, while in a power relationship it is B‘s choice whether to comply (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1963: 636). Influence is another term that can be confused with power. A has influence 
over B if A makes B change behaviour without the use of threat. As power, influence is 
relational and rational, but unlike power, influence does not depend upon the possibility of 
sanctions (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 637). 
Communication and reasoning are important aspects to understand Bachrach and Baratz‘ 
understanding of authority. It is, as power, relational and rational. The difference lies in that B 
does not comply because of the threat of sanctions, but because B recognizes the reasoning 
behind A‘s order (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 638.) 
 
Thus B‘s compliance with A‘s wishes, can be due to several other things than power. In this 
essay, I will discuss whether any of these other terms can have been relevant factors for the 





3.5 An analytical model 
Based on the abovementioned theories, in this section I will outline the analytical model to be 
used in this thesis. I will also suggest some theory-based hypotheses for the analysis. I will 
analyse developments in the two time periods along the lines of the factors of the theoretical 
framework established in chapter 3. The structure of the analysis will be as follows: 
Following Putnam‘s logic, I will first discuss factors at the national level (―level 2‖) and then 
the international level (―level 1‖). At the national level I will implement both Putnam‘s 
theories on level 2, as well as public policy theories. At the international level, I will discuss 
Putnam‘s level 1 theories, and expand this with compliance theory and Bachrach and Baratz‘s 
theories. I will use the points to analyse the situation after the two reports, and the change 
between them. 
3.5.1 The domestic level (level 2) 
For the domestic level, I will discuss the following points:  
 How important it was for Brazil and US to reach an agreement on the case  
o How important are the industries in question 
o How have the constituencies been affected by the issue 
o Have there been possible positive or negative repercussions of the issue 
o To what degree would change in this issue directly affect people‘s lives  
 The relationship been between the isolationists and the internationalists 
o How was the political atmosphere in the two countries in this respect 
 The role of the domestic coalition 
o The domestic political coalition – the political divisions in the case 
o The role of the interest groups  
 Whether the issue of trade protection aroused interest groups 
proportionally more than others  
o Was group coalescence was used as a technique 
 Timing: Whether this case included what can be viewed a window of opportunity 
 Synergistic linkage: Evans suggests this is not likely to be decisive  
 How have the domestic ratification procedure of the countries affected the case? 
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o Have the negotiators used strict ratification procedures at home in order to 
increase its win-set? 
o How have policy-making rules played in?  
o What role can the electoral system have played in order to affect the power of 
interest groups, the agricultural lobby and others? 
o Has bureaucratic capture been a factor? 
3.5.2 The international level (level 1)  
For the international level, I will address the following points:  
 How the bilateral dependence between the countries has affected the win-sets of the 
two countries 
 Whether and how the parties have strengthened their bargaining position by making 
their own win-set smaller 
o Common methods are ―demonstrating a strong stance on a case and rallying 
domestic support  
 Making your own win-set seem smaller than it is  
o Whether the negotiators have attempted the strategy of making your win-set 
seem ―kinky‖ 
 Expanding the opponents‘ win-set by side-payments. Here trade retaliation is to be 
discussed under compliance theory. 
o The management school 
 The international laws have power in themselves.  
 The role of reputation 
o The enforcement school 
 Discuss whether enforcement was effective 
 Discuss the credibility of the sanctions  
o Reverberation: Analyse if reverberation has been used strategically; if US or 
Brazil have tried to influence each other‘s win-sets/constituencies.  
o ―Decisions and non-decisions‖: Discuss whether force, influence or authority, 





Although this is not a hypothesis-testing case study, I have some expectations for the analysis 
that I choose to formulate here in the form of hypotheses. This is in order to clarify my 
expectations. I will also include some assumptions that I use as a base for my hypotheses.  
Main hypothesis: The Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation was a necessary, but not sufficient 
factor to explain the change in US policies as asked for in the research question. It acted 
together with other factors.  
Hypotheses about level 2 processes: 
 H1: The importance of the case changed after the Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation. 
This was a factor in the change in US policies.  
o Assumption: the saliency of the case for US widened the US win-set after the 
2008 report, as it was more important for US to strike a deal.  
 H2:  The US domestic balance between the internationalists and nationalists (Putnam) 
changed during the time period, which made change in US policies more likely. 
o Assumption: Obama administration had a more multilateral stance than the 
Bush administration  
 H3: The domestic ratification procedure of US is an important factor to explain why 
US did not comply fully, and why US issued side-payments to Brazil 
o H3.1: The US policy-making rules (Hiscox) was a central factor in the process  
o H3.2: The US plurality electoral system and bureaucratic capture makes US 
responsive to farmers‘ lobbies, but this can‘t explain the change in US policy 
 H4: Change in the domestic coalition (Putnam), particularly in US, was an important 
factor for change in US policies.  
o H4.1: Change in the domestic political coalition in US widened the US win-set 
o H4.2: The involvement of new interest groups (Birkland) after the cross-
retaliation threat widened the win-set significantly, and had a decisive effect 
for the outcome 
o H4.3: After the cross-retaliation threat, there was a case of group coalescence 




 The relative power of different interest groups (Birkland) was decisive: 
US farmer‘s groups are powerful, but not as powerful as other interest 
groups who were involved after the retaliation threat 
 The issue did at first not mobilise other interest groups in US than 
farmers, but when more groups were directly affected (Birkland), the 
size of the US win-set increased significantly  
 Farmers‘ groups are proportionally more loud than their size suggests, 
due to the issue of trade protection (Hiscox in Ravenhill) 
 H5: A window of opportunity (Kingdom in Birkland) enhanced the effect of the 
Brazilian cross-retaliation.  
o Assumption: The financial crisis weakened the targeted industries. This 
contributed to a window of opportunity 
Hypotheses about level 1 processes: 
 H6: The change in bilateral power relations between the two countries enhanced 
Brazil‘s bargaining position. This was a factor for the change in US policy. 
o Assumption: Brazil has become less economically dependent on US, while US 
has become more dependent on Brazil.  
 H7: Throughout the process, both parties used statements and ―window-dressing‖ to 
demonstrate commitment to the case (Putnam), thus narrowing their win-sets.  
 H 7.1: The parties attempted to make their own win-set seem smaller than they were, 
in order to better their bargaining position. 
 H8: Side-payments in the form of retaliation expanded US‘s win-set, which was a 
decisive factor for change 
o H8.1: Reputation and international norms (the management school) were not 
decisive factors for the change in US policy. 
o H8.2: Brazil‘s retaliation threats were credible and efficient (the compliance 
school), which widened the US win-set. YES 
 Assumption: WTO issuing Brazil the right to cross-retaliate made 
Brazil relatively stronger.  
o H8.3:Reverberation (Putnam) was used to widen the win-set 
 H9: Authority (Bachrach and Baratz) was a factor in the change in US policy 




I will now turn to analysing the situation after the adoption of the 2005 report and the 
situation after the 2008 report, and what can explain the change between them. The aim is to 
answer the research question: What can explain the change in US policy vis-à-vis Brazil in the 
WTO case on cotton subsidies? 
However, I will start this chapter with an analysis of what the change in US policy vis-à-vis 
Brazil consisted of. Thus I will start with answering the background research question: What 
was the change in relevant US policy actions after the 2005 report to after the 2008 report? 
4.1 The change from 2005 to 2008 
I start with repeating the outcome after 2005 and after 2008. I define the most relevant US 
policy actions following the DSB recommendations of the 2005 report as
44
:  
 The counter-cyclical payments and marketing assistance (actionable subsidies) were 
reauthorized with the 2008 farm bill, and still trade-distorting, despite US promises 
that they would change these. 
 GSM-102 (the most controversial export subsidy program) was slightly changed, but 
still constituting an export subsidy. 
 The Step 2 program was eliminated – 13 months late. 
 The GSM-103 and SCGP programs were eliminated, but not before 2008, which was 
three years late. 
I define the most relevant US reactions to the 2008 DSB recommendations and the following 
cross-retaliation threat as:  
 Easing restrictions on Brazilian products, among them beef, through the 
recognition of Santa Catarina as free of certain diseases. 
 Making modifications on the export-guarantee program GSM-102. 
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 Promising to limit trade-distorting support to US cotton farmers. 
 Issuing an annual payment of 147.3USD million to Brazilian cotton farmers. 
 Setting up regular meetings towards the next US Farm bill. 
 Brazil kept its rights to impose countermeasures 
By comparing the points above, I define the change in relevant US policy actions after the 
2005 report to after the 2008 report as the following:  
After 2008:  
 US made more significant changes to the export-guarantee program GSM-102  
 US made promises to change the trade-distorting support in 2012 Farm bill 
 Side-payments or compensation:  
o US would annually, until the farm billion which changes could be 
implemented, pay Brazil USD147,3 million per year 
o US eased restrictions on Brazilian beef 
 The promise of meetings towards the next US farm bill, along with the fact that 
Brazil still could impose countermeasures 
This suggests that US through its policy actions has gone further in complying with the DSB 
recommendations, and in meeting Brazil‘s interests, after the 2008 report than after the 2005 
report. Note, however, that US has not yet complied with the findings.  
Both US and Brazilian officials seemed pleased with the outcome. After the Framework deal 
of June 2010 was announced, the USTR released a press release in which the US Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk as well as Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack expressed 
satisfaction with the outcome (USTR 2010).  
Despite that the majority of official statements from Brazil were positive to the outcome, 
there were also Brazilians who were not pleased with the June 2010 Framework. After its 
release, some Brazilians were critical, saying it didn‘t ―go far enough to right the wrongs of 
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US cotton subsidies‖ (ICTSD 2010a). Former secretary at the Brazilian agricultural ministry, 
Pedro de Camargo Neto, complained that it ―‘lacked the symbolism of change‘ in US policy 
that Brazil has sought with its WTO suit‖ (ICTSD 2010a). This may suggest that the outcome 
of the deal was not as good for Brazil as it could or should have been. Thus one of the things I 
must explain here is why Brazil didn‘t manage to change the US subsidies enough to 
eradicate their negative consequences, and why they nevertheless accepted the deal, with 
main officials stating it was a good outcome. I also need to explain why US ended up issuing 
side-payments to Brazil. 
I will now analyse factors that can explain the changes in US policy defined here. I will start 
with the domestic level, and then move on to the international level. I will refer to relevant 
hypotheses throughout the analysis. However, as the levels interact (which, indeed, is one of 
Putnam‘s central ideas), there will be some overlapping between the discussions on the 
different levels.  
4.2 The domestic level 
4.2.1 The importance of the case 
 H1: The importance of the case changed after the Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation. 
This was a factor in the change in US policies. 
45
  
I will now discuss how the importance of reaching a solution on the case, and of the case 
itself, has affected the win-set of the two countries, and thus their bargaining position 
(Putnam). I will have in mind that these factors may interact. I will start by discussing US, 
then Brazil. 
The importance of the case for US 
46
Cotton export has increased its importance in the US economy in the last years. Supporters 
of the subsidies, and in particular the subsidies linked to export, argued that without these, the 
producers would not be able to sell the products abroad. Further they argued that this would 
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constitute a serious threat to US cotton production (The Farmer
47
 2005a).  For cotton farmers, 
reaching an agreement did not seem important, or desirable, as the farmers are more likely to 
suffer under an agreement (by decreased subsidies) than under a non-agreement (in which the 
subsidies are kept at the status quo). Rather, the grown importance of cotton production 
slightly increases the importance of cotton farmers in the US constituency. This can give US 
negotiators slightly larger support for a strong stance on US cotton, decreasing their win-set.
48
  
The case was, however, important for US in a different sense, as it could have negative 
repercussions for other types of farm support (Sumner 2005). If US accepted this decision, it 
could create precedence for other types of subsidies to be challenged in WTO. This was a 
strong incentive for US to not accept the decision. This made the US win-set smaller and thus 
post-2005 US compliance increasingly difficult. 
President Barack Obama has signalled that he is positive to cuts in farm subsidies. In his 
speech to Congress February 24
th
 2009, he said that he would ―end direct payments to large 
agribusinesses that don‘t need them‖ (Obama 2009), a stance he repeated when issuing his 
2012 budget plan (Reuters 2011). This widened the US win-set on the case of subsidies in 
general after the 2008 report, and can help explain why US went further in complying. But as 
the main change did not occur before Brazilian threatened to cross-retaliate in March 2010, 
this was probably not a decisive factor for the change in US policy.  
After the 2008 report the US win-set widened significantly. The reason for this is that more 
actors than US farmers were involved in the case. This is due to the Brazilian threat of 
retaliation, which implied that a non-agreement would cause retaliation measures. The most 
important industries to suffer from this were not cotton farmers, but other manufacturers
49
. 
The fact that cotton has become more important in the economy is likely to have far less 
effect on the US win-set that the negative possible impact of retaliation against other sectors. 
The possible damage done to other US sectors made the possible negative impacts of a non-
agreement a lot bigger, as well as increasing the importance of the case. This widened the US 
win-set after 2008.  
To sum up: After the first report, the possible losses for US of a non-agreement were not that 
large. Thus the win-set of US was smaller, and they had more bargaining strength. But after 
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the second report, the Brazilian retaliation threat made it important for US politicians and a 
significant part of the constituency to reach a deal. This significantly widened the US win-set, 
and weakened the US bargaining position.  
The importance of the case for Brazil 
50
Cotton production is gaining importance within the Brazilian agricultural economy. This 
makes the case of cotton subsidies increasingly relevant and perhaps even more relevant in 
the future. Also, agriculture persists as a decisive factor for Brazilian growth and an important 
part of the Brazilian economy. This suggests that the case is important also for Brazil in a 
broader context, as other sectors may be interested in shedding subsidies in developed 
countries‘ production in their competing sectors. This suggests that the case is of high 
importance for Brazil. This can have two, seemingly opposing implications.  
First, it may enlarge the Brazilian win-set. It is important for Brazil to reach a solution on the 
case, and perhaps more important as cotton has gained importance – in other words, more 
important after the second than after the first report. In a situation in which it is more 
important for a country to reach an agreement, Putnam argues that the win-set increases. Thus 
this suggests that the Brazilian win-set becomes larger after the second report, making Brazil 
more susceptible to making a deal.  
But does this assumption of Putnam really fit for Brazil? The presumption is that Brazil has 
something to win on an agreement (removing illegal US cotton subsidies) and something to 
lose on opting out (not getting the subsidies removed). The more important it is for Brazil to 
delete the cotton subsidies, the more important is it for them to reach an agreement, and the 
larger is their win-set and the weaker the bargaining power. However, if the issue – US cotton 
subsidies – is not a very large burden to their economy, Brazil can easily afford to wait for an 
agreement. As we have seen cotton is rated far from the largest Brazilian agricultural crop, 
despite its relative growth as a commodity. The relatively low importance of cotton in the 
Brazilian economy suggests that it may not be that important for Brazil to get rid of the US 
subsidies immediately, and thus the win-set may not have grown that significantly.  
The other implication suggests that the win-set may have become smaller for Brazil after the 
second report. This is because the increased importance of the cotton sector may have made 
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Brazilian voters more devoted to the issue, and thus the support among the Brazilian 
constituency for a strong stance in the case may increase. This may decrease the size of the 
Brazilian win-set after the second compared to after the first report.
51
  However, the Brazilian 
cross-retaliation threat in 2010 could harm Brazilian consumers would have to pay more for 
US goods. This was likely to increase Brazil‘s need to reach an agreement.52 
To sum up: the importance for Brazil to reach an agreement in this case can have increased as 
the cotton production has increased. However, this may not have led to the resulting enlarging 
of win-set expected by Putnam. The increased Brazilian devotion to the issue, and the fact 
that cotton still is a relatively small part of the Brazilian agricultural production, may have 
decreased the win-set. On the other hand again, the interest of Brazilian consumers in 
avoiding retaliation, may have made it more important to reach an agreement, making the 
win-set after the second report wider. Thus it seems unclear what effect this aspect has had on 
the Brazilian win-set, and thus on the Brazilian bargaining power, from after the first to after 
the second agreement.  
4.2.2 The balance between isolationists and internationalists  
 H2: The balance between the internationalists and nationalists (Putnam) changed for 
US during the time period, which made change in US policies more likely. 
Putnam argues that if internationalists dominate the political scene, win-sets in international 
negotiations are likely to become larger. In this section I will discuss the characteristics of the 
political leadership of the two countries in terms of how isolationist or internationalist they 
were. 
 
Brazil has had a relatively stable and firm stance on defending Brazilian interests throughout 
the case, at the same time as being dominated by internationalists. Brazil‘s position in 
international trade negotiations has been relatively stable throughout the first decade of the 
millennium, or at least since 2003, as the Lula government was in office from that year to the 
current (2011). I classify Lula‘s international trade policy as tough in international trade 
negotiations (WTO), and as a proponent for freer trade for Brazilian agricultural exporters. 
Because the richer countries of the world has been weakly committed to this cause, Lula 
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could propose freer agricultural trade – a traditional rightist argument – and combine this with 
an appeal to the leftist sentiments of anti-imperialism and pro-developing country in his 
constituency (Ondetti and Rhodes 2010: 35). Under Lula, Brazil has been a central actor in 
uniting developing countries in WTO negotiations, often opposing the proposals of richer 
countries, highlighting South-South diplomacy. Thus he used trade policy to rally support 
among his core constituency (Ondetti and Rhodes 2010: 1-2). Brazil under Lula, and thus in 
the time period of this analysis, can thus be understood as fairly internationalist (in the sense 
of being positive to international negotiations), however, with a strong stance when it comes 
to pursuing Brazilian interests, and with a strong support in his constituency for a strong 
Brazilian stance. This case is thus likely to have strong support in the constituency. The 
internationalist stance may have widened the Brazilian win-set, but the fierce opposition to 
rich countries‘ (in particular the US‘s) dominance in WTO, narrows the win-set. Thus this 




I will now discuss if there has been a change in the balance between internationalists and 
nationalists in US. Most of the process has played out under the Bush presidency. But most of 
what is defined in chapter 2 as the outcome after the 2008 report, is expressed in the June 
2010 Framework. This is after Barack Obama‘s inauguration as President. Looking at the 
overall US foreign policy, several have argued that the Obama administration is significantly 
more responsive to international norms and law than the Bush administration (see Foreign 
Policy 2010). Obama himself suggested that his presidency would be more based on 
multilateral cooperation, and international principles and law in his 2007 essay Renewing 
American Leadership (See Obama 2007: 9, 11, 13, 15). This suggests that the Obama 
administration would be more responsive to WTO law and recommendations, which would 
make the Obama administration more likely to change their policies after the 2008 report than 
after the 2005 report. However, if this was a decisive reason for the change, one should expect 
US to change its policies earlier, if not immediately after the inauguration of Barack Obama 
in 2009, then at least show signals towards change after a relatively short time. The final US 
response I‘m referring here only occurred after Brazil‘s threat of retaliation, which was in 
March 2010. This suggests that a change towards a more internationalist stance following the 
change in US presidency was not decisive for the outcome of the case. Also, the balance 
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between internationalists and isolationists is dependent on the composition of the members of 
Congress, which is discussed under point 4.2.4, where also party colour will be discussed.  
 
4.2.3 Domestic ratification procedure and institutional factors  
 H3: The domestic ratification procedure of US is an important factor to explain why 
US did not comply fully, and why US issued side-payments to Brazil 
As suggested in the theory chapter, the institutional factors of the US political system can help 
explain why narrow interest groups like farmers‘ lobby groups have a lot of power. And the 
US negotiators can have used the strict ratification procedures in US in order to increase their 
own win-set. However, can it explain the change in US policy?  
As the change in US policy was dependent on ratification in the US domestic political system, 
the main focus of this section is on US institutions. However, the Brazilian system also played 
in after WTO allowed Brazil to cross-retaliate, as I will show below. 
Policy-making rules 
 H3.1: The US policy-making rules (Hiscox) was a central factor in the process  
The most important policy-making aspect is that the changes in agricultural subsidies which 
the DSB reports recommend have to go through Congress. This is relevant both for changes 
that was to be made in the farm bill, and for changes that could be made in separate decisions, 
or in the US Budget. That the changes had to go through the Congress was underlined by 
USTR Ron Kirk in 2010 (Imarketnews 2010). As bills must go through both houses, the 
coalitions in both houses are relevant. Congressmen from the so-called ―farm states‖54, are 
unlikely to support cuts in farm subsidies (New York Times 2007). The overrepresentation of 
farmers in the US Senate is likely to make subsidy cuts difficult to ratify. 
As discussed in chapter 2, a US farm bill was signed in 2008. The fact that the farm bill 
debate and resolution was lying ahead of the US policy process when the 2005 report was 
issued, gave the US negotiators a strong card: they got the possibility to ―blame‖ the need to 
wait for the farm bill process for not changing the challenged programmes earlier. It is also 
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fair to assume that Brazilian negotiators hoped for significant change in this bill. This 
narrowed the US win-set after this first report, as compliance was made dependent on 
resolutions in the future farm bill. This can help explain why US did not comply more with 
the first report. 
Interestingly, when the 2008 farm bill was to be passed, the agricultural secretary and the 
Bush administration originally aimed to limit farm subsidies to wealthy farmers. However, 
these suggestions did not pass in Congress, which ended up passing a much more generous 




Some measures could clearly be decided outside Congress, as the modifications of the GSM-
102 programme were done by the Department of Agriculture (New York Times 2010). 
Despite this, the Brazilian acceptance of that US did not immediately bring their cotton 
programme into compliance with WTO recommendations, suggests that they acknowledged 
that most of the US policy process had to go through Congress, after the second as well as the 
first report. This is suggested by the following statement by Márcio Cozendey after Brazil‘s 
retaliation threat in March 2010: ―We know this depends on Congress and can take time‖, 
referring to the US farm bill process (ICTSD 2010b). This Brazilian acceptance widened the 
Brazilian win-set and helps explain why the Brazilians accepted side payments instead of 
immediate compliance.  
When WTO gave Brazil the right to cross-retaliate against US sectors in 2009, one of the 
sanction measures that was allowed, was that Brazilian pharmaceutical companies was 
allowed to produce medicines which ordinarily were protected by US patents. This was 
retaliation allowed under TRIPS. The Brazilian government immediately prepared a 
―provisional measure‖ which allowed Brazilian companies to produce such products. Such a 
measure is a presidential decree with immediate effect. It must later be ratified by the 
Brazilian Congress, however (ICTSD 2009a). Nevertheless, the possibility of preparing a 
―provisional measure‖ made it possible for Brazil to react quickly, thereby enhancing the 
efficiency of the threat – showing US that Brazil were serious in their intentions.  
                                                 
55




The electoral system and bureaucratic capture 
 H3.2: The US plurality electoral system and bureaucratic capture makes US 
responsive to farmers’ lobbies, but this can’t explain the change in US policy 
I argue that the electoral system does not explain the change in US policy which the research 
question asks about. Plurality and geographical divisions makes US more responsive to 
farmers lobbies. However, as there has not been a change in the US electoral system, this 
cannot explain a change from after the first to after the second report.  
As mentioned above, the USDA is listed as a typical example of bureaucratic capture. This is 
supported by Paarlberg and Paarlberg (2000), who argue that beneficiaries to farmers will be 
supported by the agriculture committees in Congress and by the USDA, as these institutions 
are the ones who administer the farming programs. Thus they need these programs in order to 
justify the size of their budget and organisations (Paarlberg and Paarlberg 2000: 148). This 
again supports the notion that the Secretary of Agriculture is regarded as an advocate for 
farmers.  
Those who have been Secretary of Agriculture on this case all have had quite similar 
backgrounds, and support the notion of a stable relationship between the bureaucracy and the . 
Tom Vilsack (2009 -) has close ties to agribusiness and is previous governor of an agricultural 
state.  Ed Schafer (2009 – 2009) and Mike Johanns (2005 – 2007) were also previous 
governors of farm states. I have not found data suggesting that change in secretary was a 
factor in the change in US policies from after the 2005 report to after the 2008 report.  
The institutional factors can explain the close ties between the US farmers‘ lobbies and the 
US legislatures and bureaucracy, and thus the high support for agricultural subsidies. It can 
further help explain why removing subsidies is a difficult task in US politics. However, there 
has not been a change in the electoral system, and I have not found data suggesting that there 
has been a change in the bureaucratic capture in US agricultural politics. When it comes to 




4.2.4 The domestic coalition56  
 H4: Change in the domestic coalition (Putnam), particularly in US, was an important 
factor for change in US policies.  
I will now discuss the role of domestic political coalition and of interest groups. Who was 
likely to support and object to an agreement, and would it be possible to get the agreement 
through at the domestic level? I will analyse how the domestic coalitions changed after the 
second report, and how this affected the change in US policies. This discussion is largely 
based on elements from public policy.  
The political coalition 
 H4.1: Change in the domestic political coalition in US widened the US win-set 
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that a new Congress in US may have changed the 
political coalition in a direction which made change in US policies easier to ratify, which 
could have explained some of the changes in US policy asked for in the research question. 
However, my analysis suggests that this hypothesis does not hold. 
In US, there was a turn from a Republican to a Democratic president in 2009, and there was a 
Democratic majority in Congress from 2007 to 2011 (Office of the Clerk). However, did this 
shift the political atmosphere towards a more likely stance on decreasing or eliminating cotton 
subsidies, as my hypothesis suggests? Republican presidents have repeatedly supported 
protectionist measures (Hiscox in Ravenhill 2008: 117). Further, Fordham and McKeown 
(2003) suggest that the party contributors from agricultural sectors are more closely linked to 
the Republicans than to the Democrats. However, the same literature suggests that cotton-
dominated districts were more likely to be Democratic (Fordham and McKeown 2003: 533 – 
534). Also, Republicans are in general more market-oriented than Democrats, with a tradition 
of being oriented towards tight fiscal budgets. Paarlberg and Paarlberg (2000: 160) argue that 
a Democratic House is less likely to support liberal agricultural reform than a Republican 
House. Republicans are thought to be more positive towards lowering trade barriers than 
Democrats (The Economist 2007a). This suggests that the possibility for removing subsidies 
is larger under a Republican Congress and President, as was the case until January 2007 and 
January 2009, respectively. Thus the US win-set in this case would be thought to become 
smaller when Democrats took over the Congress and White House, which was in the period 
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after the second report. However, as mentioned above, political and Congress support for US 
farmers, and cotton farmers in particular, are dependent on other factors than party colour: 
geography, lobbying ties etc, and politicians opposing the subsidies are found among 
Republicans as well as Democrats. Based on this, I argue that change in party coalition in 
Congress was not an important factor for the US win-set in this case.  
The fast-track authority is mentioned in the theory. President Bush used the fast-track 
authority to establish several free trade agreements (Tucker and Wallach 2009). However, I 
have not found that the fast-track authority was used in relevance to this case. 
As I discussed in chapter 2, parts of the recommendations from the DSB had to be ratified in 
the US farm bill. However, the 2008 farm bill extended the support to US farmers
57
, despite 
Kind and Flake‘s efforts (see below).  The 2008 farm bill process discussed in the following 
paragraph, illustrates the trade-offs in the domestic coalition between farm policy reform and 
other policy areas.  
Leading up to the 2008 farm bill, two Congressmen, Ron Kind (Democrat) and Jeff Flake 
(Republican) made a failed attempt to use the farm bill process in the House to make reform 
in US agricultural policy, including cutting subsidies. They were met with strong resistance. I 
will not refer the details of the House process here, only the most illustrative points. Early in 
the process Chair of the House Agricultural committee Collin Peterson (Democrat) warned 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who had first signalled farm policy reform, that Democratic 
first-years in Congress could lose votes in rural districts if she supported significant changes 
in farm policies. Democrats supporting the current agricultural policy threatened Pelosi with 
withdrawing their support from a health insurance program for children if she supported 
change in agricultural policy. This lead to Pelosi supporting the House Agriculture 
Committee, a committee which represents districts that receive 42 percent of the total 
subsidies, and thus depend on votes from these districts. Further, Peterson bought off those in 
the Agriculture Committee
58
 that wanted reform of the farm policy with side-payments, 
amounting to USD10 billion. The Kind-Flake reform bill was voted down in the House with a 
significant majority vote (309 to 117), and the House passed a legislation that to a large extent 
extended the level of government support to farmers from the previous farm bill (Grunwald 
2007 and ICTSD 2007a). Later, the farm bill was passed in Senate, and signed by the 
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president, and, as we saw chapter 2, without meeting the DSB demands from the cotton 
subsidies case. 
Through this political horse trading, the win-set of possibilities for reduction of agricultural 
subsidies was significantly narrowed. The domestic coalition was clearly opposed to reform 
of the farm policy at this point. This again narrowed the US win-set in complying with the 
DSB 2005 findings. This case illustrates that the fear of losing support in the constituency 
makes ratification difficult. This narrows the win-set, and is a factor explaining why US did 
not go further in complying after the 2005 report. However, this does not in itself explain the 
change in policies after the 2008 report, which is what the research question asks about. 
A brief note on the Brazilian domestic political coalition: The Brazilian Congress includes a 
Senate and a Chamber of deputies. There were elections to both chambers in 2006 and in 
2002
59. In 2002 elections, Lula‘s party PT became the largest party in Senate and in the 
Chamber of Deputies. This changed slightly after the 2006 election, as the centre party PMDB 
became the largest in Congress and won most seats in the Senate
60
 (Political Database of the 
Americas 2010). However, as PMDB cooperated with Lula‘s party PT, the government kept 
power in Congress. Thus there has been little change in the Brazilian domestic political 
coalition which can have influenced the process.  
Agricultural interest groups 
 H4.2: The involvement of new interest groups (Birkland) after the cross-retaliation 
threat widened the win-set significantly, and had a decisive effect for the outcome 
The hypothesis points to agricultural interest groups as well as other interest groups. The non-
agricultural lobbies and the interplay between different interests will be discussed under the 
heading ―Group coalescence‖. First I will discuss the role of the agricultural and cotton lobby, 
and their role in the process. 
Among the central agricultural actors in US we find the American Farm Bureau, the National 
Farmer‘s Union and the sector lobbies, among them the cotton lobby. The total agribusiness 
lobby spent more than 120 million USD in 2010 (OpenSecrets.org 2011a). Thus the 
agriculture committee members are likely to be relatively more dependent on support from 
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voters supporting subsidies than others. The US agricultural lobby is viewed as being very 
effective, and with close ties to central decision makers. Paarlberg and Paarlberg argue that 
despite the decrease in numbers of US farmers, the US farming lobby has managed to make 
up for this with high-quality organisation and high campaign contributions (Paarlberg and 
Paarlberg 2000: 149). It has been argued that the large-scale farmers ―dominate the legislative 
processes in Washington‖ (Paarlberg and Paarlberg 2000: 159), relating to the legislative 
processes concerning agricultural policy. This statement supports the notion that the large-
scale farmers have an impact on US policy which exceeds the amount of voters they make 
out.  
Since 1998, the Agribusiness has given more money through the Political Action Committee 
(PAC
61
) system to the Republicans than to the Democrats. However, the gap has diminished, 
and in 2010, Democrats received 49 percent of the agribusiness PAC contributions. Further, 
within the crop production subdivision, Democrats received 62 percent of the contributions in 
2010. This is a certain turn in trends as the Republicans received 52 percent of the support 
from 1998 to 2006 (Opensecrets.org 2011d; Opensecrets.org 2011e). As noted above, the 
Congress turned from a Republican to a Democrat majority in 2007. This suggests that party 
colour is not the decisive factor when the agricultural lobby decides who to support, but 
rather, which is in power. 
The US Cotton lobby, which is united in the National Cotton Council (NCC), is a strong 
lobby, with powerful connections in US Congress. Scott Lincicome, blogger and international 
trade lawyer, stated: ―We‘ve seen over and over and over that congressmen and senators who 
are big supporters of agribusiness don‘t care about WTO rulings. US cotton farmers are a very 
powerful lobby‖ (ICTSD 2010c). As a lobbying client, the NCC has increased its lobbying 
expenditures the last years. In 2005, it spent USD 260 000, in 2010 it spend USD 380 000 
(OpenSecrets.org 2011b). As a PAC, NCC spent about 400 000 USD in 2010, 56 percent of 
which on Democratic candidates. However, between 1996 and 2006, Republicans were top 
recipients (Opensecrets.org 2011c). This suggests that the cotton lobby, as the agricultural 
lobby, choose their recipients depending on who is in power.  
In 2005, the cotton industry was backed by Thad Cochran, chairman of the Senate 
appropriations committee, and of Saxby Chambliss, the chair of the Senate agricultural 
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committee (AFP 2005). In 2010 one of their closest supporters was Blanche Lincoln 
(Democrat), chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee (ICTSD 2010c). These powerful 
connections to Congress are generally thought to make reform on cotton subsidies difficult 
(BBC 2010). This narrows the US win-set. Despite the increase in lobby spending, I have not 
found other factors suggesting that the strength of the connections to Congress has changed 
significantly between the two reports. Thus this was not a decisive factor for the change in US 
policy from after the 2005 report to after the 2008 report.  
The reaction of the NCC to the 2005 report was to firmly oppose its findings. NCC repeatedly 
denied that the US subsidies were a problem for world cotton prices (AFP 2005; 
Farmprogress 2006). Further, the CEO of NCC argued that the cotton industry was ―being 
punished for all the world‘s economic ills‖, as it was used as a central case in the WTO Hong 
Kong minister meeting of 2005 when discussing the need to reducing subsidies (Farmprogress 
2006). Following the assumption that the cotton lobby had impact on the US political process, 
this stance narrowed the US win-set.  
The stance of NCC did hardly change from 2005 to 2008, as NCC remained firm on the point 
that the US subsidies did not significantly oppress world prices (NCC 2010b). The strong 
opposition from the cotton lobby on this case corresponds with Hiscox‘ point that trade 
protection arises protectionist interest groups proportionally more than others, and with 
Birkland‘s point that groups that are directly affected by a change, will be louder and more 
influential. A 2007 article about the farm bill underlines this: ―For health, business and 
environmental groups, the farm bill is a compelling issue, but for the farm lobby, it‘s the 
issue, and politicians oppose it at their peril‖ (Grunwald 2007). After the 2005-report, this 
narrowed the US win-set, as few other US actors had strong interests in the case. As we shall 
see, this changed after the Brazilian threat of retaliation. 
I will now analyse the domestic coalition after 2008. When the WTO panel allowed Brazil to 
cross-retaliate against US in 2009, the cotton lobby and the farm lobby reacted sharply. They 
argued that changing the GSM-102 program in the 2008 farm bill had brought US policy into 
compliance with the WTO demands. Jay Hardwick, the NCC chairman said in a statement: 
―The US cotton programme and export credit guarantee programmes have changed 
considerably since 2005. (…) Today‘s programmes cannot possibly be determined to be 
causing injury in the world market‖ (ICTSD 2009a ). NCC also argued that the subsidies were 
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necessary for their farmers: ―We feel this is a very important financial safety net for 
producers,‖ Gary Adams at the NCC stated in March 2010 (BBC 2010). 
In fact, after Brazil got the right to retaliate, NCC got together with six other US farming 
groups and signed a statement asking the US government to ―request a new Compliance Panel 
to update this ruling to reflect the changes in the program made by Congress and the USDA 
since 2005‖ (NCC 2009). This clearly demonstrates a strong stance against the ruling, and a 
strong belief in that they have complied, despite WTO‘s findings. Interestingly, US never 
requested such a new compliance panel. This may suggest that the government and the farm 
lobby were slightly beginning to part paths in terms of how they perceived the case – that the 
government had become less supportive to the industries‘ claims about compliance. 
To sum up this part: I argue that there has not been a significant change in the power of the 
agricultural and cotton lobbying groups from the period after the first to the period after the 
second report, when these lobbying groups are seen in isolation. The difference in the party 
affiliations, which could come in play in the change from a Republican to a Democratic 
Congress and ditto President, has neither influenced the win-set significantly. However, the 
agricultural lobbies‘ relative power compared with other US interests changed when other 
industries became part of the game after Brazil‘s threat of retaliation in 2010. Before these 
other industries entered the game, the groups opposing the US agricultural subsidies were 
neither very loud nor powerful in terms of number of voters or money. And, as mentioned, the 
groups that suffered from them were primarily tax payers, and the ―suffering‖ was far from 
serious enough to raise significant opposition.  
The Brazilian cotton lobby can have contributed to the fact that Brazil accepted the deal. The 
Brazilian cotton producers were important drivers behind the Brazilian decision to take the 
case to WTO in 2002 (New York Times 2010; Le Quotidien Senegal 2010), and in the soon-
to-be decade since then, the Brazilian cotton industry has grown significantly (see discussion 
about Brazilian cotton industry above and Rio Times 2011). The Brazilian cotton lobby put 
pressure on the government to retaliate, according to Financial Times: ―under pressure from 
its cotton growers, is preparing to retaliate‖ (Financial Times 2009a) This makes it likely that 
the Brazilian lobby has become more, not less, powerful during this DSB process. In the June 
2010 Framework Agreement, which I define as the preliminary outcome of the process for the 
purpose of this essay, significant annual payments to the Brazilian cotton industry is an 
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important part of the deal. The fact that this was accepted in the deal from the side Brazilian 
negotiators, can perhaps be explained partly by the rising importance of the cotton industry.  
Group coalescence 
 H4.3: After the cross-retaliation threat, there was a case of group coalescence 
(Birkland) between parties which opposed the cotton subsidies 
I will now discuss the role of non-agricultural US lobbies and interest groups. The cross-
retaliation threat by Brazil, which was authorised in 2009 and exercised in March 2010, 
changed the domestic coalition in US. This happened because other interest groups, 
threatened by the possibility of trade sanctions, were directly affected by the case. Suddenly 
new groups had an interest in that US complied with DSB recommendations. This move was 
strengthened by group coalescence between different US lobbies, industries and politicians. 
The US win-set thus widened significantly, which I argue was a central factor for why US 
changed more favourably towards Brazil‘s wishes after the 2008 report. 
Among the 102 goods on the first list of retaliation measures that Brazil issued, there were 
automotives, foods, tires, toiletries, cosmetics, electronics and textiles (WTO 2010d). I will 
not enter into a discussion on each and one of the lobbying groups connected to the different 
goods, as this is beyond the scope of this essay. However, this illustrates that a broad range of 
industries were threatened. Several of the goods were classified as luxury goods (ICTSD 
2010b), which were vulnerable in the global economic downturn. The financial crisis had 
harmed US exports in general, which made the retaliation threat more effective.
62
 I will 
discuss the power of the car lobby as it is an example of one of the strong lobbies that were 
threatened by Brazil‘s retaliation. I will also discuss some intellectual property industries, as 
these were threatened after Brazil released the second list. 
The automotive lobby is a powerful US lobby (The Independent 2008 and OpenSecrets.org 
2011f). If one compares the lobby spending of the car industry with the spending of the crop 
production and basic processing sector (which the cotton lobby is part of), one finds that the 
former has spent about three times as much in annual lobbying over the last years than the 
latter. The automotive lobby has spent about USD 60 million a year on lobbying since 2006 
(OpenSecrets.org 2011f), while crop production and basic processing has varied from about 
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USD 14 million to almost USD 22 million a year in the same time span (OpenSecrets.org 
2011g). And if one compares the automobile industry with the cotton lobby, which as 
mentioned above spent about USD 400 000 in annual lobbying, the latter becomes small in 
terms of contribution numbers. Birkland suggests that money and resources increase the 
power of interest groups. Following this, pressure from the automotive lobby on reaching an 
agreement in this case, is likely to have an impact, which can have helped push the US 
political leaders towards reaching an agreement with Brazil. Together with pressure from 
other lobbies that were threatened by cross-retaliation, this probably widened the US win-set, 
making US more willing to reach an agreement. I therefore see the power of the automotive 
lobby, and other industries, as a factor which is likely to have made US change their policies 
in order to avoid cross-retaliation. This can explain why US policies changed more favourably 
towards Brazil‘s wishes after the second report. 
As noted in chapter 2, a few weeks after Brazil had released the list of goods that would be 
subject to retaliation, they released the list of intellectual property industries that could be 
subject to retaliation. Targeting intellectual property would hurt US much more than imposing 
duties on Brazilian imports of US goods (Financial Times 2009a). When submitting the list of 
products under which they could suspend copyrights, patents and royalties, Brazil‘s head of 
the Foreign Ministry‘s economic department, Carlos Marcio Cosendey, said: ―These are 
temporary measures aimed to force a change in the US‖ (Bloomberg 2010a). This suggests 
that the Brazilian political leaders knew this was a serious threat to US industries. And 
indeed, representative of US chamber of commerce, Mark Esper, stated that the threat of 
suspending intellectual property rights was serious to the US economy: ―Even a temporary 
measure that results in the undermining of any IP
63
 rights – whether patents, trademarks or 
copyrights – will cause substantial harm to IP-based industries, workers, and consumers in 
both the U.S. and Brazil‖ (Wall Street Journal 2010a). This suggests that cross-retaliation 
strengthened Brazilian negotiating power. 
Typical IP-based industries are the pharmaceutical industry and the computer industry. The 
pharmaceutical and health product industry is listed as one of the highest contributors to 
federal campaigns, a position which has been consistent over the last years (OpenSecrets.org 
2011h). In 2010, it was listed as the ninth largest contributor to members of Congress (in 
2008, the 17
th
 largest, and in 2006, the 10
th
 largest). The crop production and basic processing 
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industry, in comparison, was the 23
rd
 largest (OpenSecrets.org 2011i). And like the farm 
lobby, the division of contributions between Democrats and Republicans has shifted 
depending on the majority in Congress (OpenSecrets.org 2011j). The computer and internet 
industry is also larger than the farmers‘ lobby: it was the 21st largest contributor in 2010 and 
the 13
th
 largest in 2008, and in 2006, the 18
th
 largest. The contribution has traditionally been 
evenly split between the two main US parties. However, the last years there has been a 
Democratic bias (OpenSecrets.org 2010). Note also that for both these industries, the largest 
2008 recipient was Barack Obama. The largest 2008 recipient for the crop production and 
basic processing industry was John McCain (OpenSecrets.org 2009). This is likely to be due 
to the presidential campaign running at that time. More importantly, it suggests that president 
Obama is likely to be responsive to the IP industry. This can have increased the IP industries‘ 
power relative to the farmers‘ lobby. Pressure from IP and pharmaceutical industry is likely to 
have narrowed the US win-set, which made it more urgent for US to strike a deal to avoid the 
retaliation. The power of these lobbies interplayed with the timing of the threat.
64
  
After Brazil had released the first list of sanctions March 8
th
 2010, the representative of the 
Brazil-US Business Council also joined the debate. This is an organisation which promotes 
free trade and investment between Brazil and US, aiming to advocate the interests of 
businesses between the two countries. The organization urged US to do what they could to 
avoid the retaliation, and to comply with its WTO obligations (BBC 2010).  
Following the Brazilian listing of goods, the political environment started moving as well. 
Congressmen Ron Kind (Democrat) and Jeff Flake (Republican), who had been working to 
reform US farm subsidies, sent a letter, also signed by Congressmen Barney Frank and Paul 
Ryan, to President Obama. It was sent after the first interim agreement between US and Brazil 
to postpone the retaliation (April 2010). In this letter, they argued that ―the US cotton 
program is a barrier to trade and economic growth and must be reformed‖, urging the 
president to work to reform the subsidies (Kind et al). They argued that the retaliation threat 
from Brazil occurred as a consequence of Congress‘ ―inability to reform the subsidy program 
in the farm bill‖, and also expressed fears that this could spill over to other disputes against 
other types of US subsidies, something which would have a strongly negative effect on US 
business and workers. They further argued that the deal to pay Brazilian agribusiness close to 
USD150 million a year was negative, arguing that this was fiscally irresponsible, distorting 
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trade, and not a responsible use of US taxpayers‘ money. In addition to arguing in the interest 
of the taxpayer, they pointed to the ―current fiscal situation‖. I interpret this as indicating that 
the US difficulties following the financial crisis, and the large US budget deficit, makes it 
unwise to continue with the current subsidies. They argued that the subsidies were illegal, and 
that there were significant amounts to save in annual federal budget spending. They estimated 
that changing the US cotton program into compliance with the WTO dispute settlement 
ruling, the government could save minimum USD1.8 billion a year. They also included a 
moral argument saying: ―we cannot expect our trading partners to play by the rules if we are 
not willing to do the same‖ (Kind et al 2010).  
This letter combined an array of different arguments for reforming the US cotton program, 
representing several interests in the US economy. This indicates that this can be a case of 
group coalescence. This is supported by the above discussion of how non-agricultural lobby 
groups had interest in avoiding retaliation, and by the following: after US and Brazil had 
agreed on the Framework agreement in June 2010, Kind and Flake received a letter in which 
several organisations thanked them for their support in avoiding trade retaliation. Among the 
signatures were representatives of the medical, automotive, information technology and 
pharmaceutical industry, the Intellectual Property Owners Association and the US Chamber 
of Commerce (BRAZTAC 2010). Also, Secretary of Agriculture in US Tom Vilsack 
indicated how different groups‘ interests were raised in this case, as he said that he looked 
forward to reaching a solution that would meet ―the needs of American farmers, workers and 
consumers‖ (USTR 2010b). This group coalescence significantly weakened the relative 
influence of the farmers‘ lobby, and thus the domestic coalition in US. It became costly for 
the US not to comply, due to that non-compliance would affect other strong parts of the US 
industry and economy. The US win-set was significantly widened, and the US agricultural 
lobby got weaker bargaining power. This is a central factor for why US accepted a deal which 
was more favourable towards Brazil‘s interests. 
After the first preliminary agreement, note that Kind and Flake were negative to the payments 
to Brazilian farmers. However, the NCC, the US Trade Representative Ron Kirk, and Tom 
Vilsack, agricultural secretary, expressed satisfaction with the deal (New York Times 2010). 
Brazil also expressed satisfaction. However, US politicians who were critical to the US 
subsidy programmes were not satisfied. US pleased Brazil despite lack of full compliance, 
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partly by issuing side-payments
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 in the 2010 Framework Deal. These side-payments are 
likely to be due to the need to ―buy out‖ Brazilian interests, and opposed the interest of US 
actors who wanted cuts in subsidies. This suggests that the US politicians opposing subsidies 
had little influence on the outcome of the case.  
Others who could lose on the Brazilian retaliation on US goods are Brazilian consumers, for 
whom the US goods would become more expensive. This thus widened the Brazilian win-set 
slightly, as Brazilian consumers, who are an important part of the constituency, could oppose 
retaliation. However, the right to impose measures within TRIPS, on intellectual property, 
could also make products cheaper for Brazilian consumers (ICTSD 2010d). Thus the 
retaliation would be easier to bear for the Brazilian constituency. This made the win-set of 
Brazil smaller, bettering their bargaining position. 
After Brazil‘s threat to cross-retaliate, some Brazilian officials feared that this could have a 
negative effect on US investments in Brazil. A spokeswoman from USTR gave the same 
warning. Others feared that the USD2.5 billion trade privileges given Brazil from US under 
the Generalized System of Preferences could be suspended (ICTSD 2010b). This could then 
make the Brazilian win-set after the threats of retaliation larger, as it is an incentive against 
retaliation. This can have made the Brazilian win-set bigger, weakening their bargaining 
position. This can help explain why Brazil suspended retaliation, in stead of going through 
with them, despite that US did not eradicate their illegal subsidies.  
4.2.5 Public policy: timing 
 H5: A window of opportunity (Kingdom in Birkland) enhanced the effect of the 
Brazilian cross-retaliation.  
The situation after the 2008 report opened up a window of opportunity for Brazil, and this 
widened the US win-set. The financial crisis, the fiscal deficit and the rising lack of jobs made 
the US economy vulnerable, and weaker than earlier.  
The financial crisis is discussed in chapter 2. As mentioned, several of the targeted goods 
were severely hit by the financial crisis, and US exports were hit particularly hard. The 
financial crisis strongly exacerbated the retaliation threat, particularly because Brazil 
threatened to reverberate against sectors which were severely hit by the crisis. The retaliation 
                                                 
65
 See 4.3. 
74 
 
threatened US jobs and exports. In the first retaliation threat against goods (March 8
th
 2010), 
Brazil raised tariffs on cars with 50 percent (BBC 2010).  By doing this, Brazil targeted the 
US economy one of the places that hurt the most, as the US car industry had been particularly 
hard hit in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Financial Times 2009b; Financial 
Times 2009c).
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 The Brazilian intention was explicitly expressed by the head of economic 
affairs, Carlos Marcio Cozendey from the Brazilian foreign ministry, who said that ―The idea 
was to distribute the retaliation broadly in order to maximize pressure‖ (BBC 2010). This 
suggests that the Brazilian leaders had considered the timing, and attempted to use the 
window of opportunity to make the most of their retaliation threat.  
The retaliation threat from Brazil came more or less at the same time as President Barack 
Obama announced that he wanted US export to double over the coming five years, in an effort 
to fight the negative trade balance and help bettering the US economy (The Economist 
2010a). The threat of Brazil to impose tariffs on important US goods was therefore badly 
timed for US as such tariffs would then be particularly painful. This made it more important 
for US to reach an agreement, which widened the US win-set, weakening their bargaining 
position.  
The cross-retaliation threat was issued at the same time as the US Commerce Secretary visited 
Brasilia. The aim of the visit was to promote the US National Export Initiative. (Americas 
Society/Council of the Americas 2010) This suggests that Brazil timed the threat in order to 
create maximum effect, as the retaliation would work against the very aim of this initiative.  
Paarlberg and Paarlberg (2000: 160) suggest that a budget surplus may cause Congress to 
keep high agricultural support. Following this, it should be possible to argue the opposite: that 
a budget deficit may be an incentive to cut government spending on farming support. As 
showed under section 2.2, US has struggled with a large budget deficit over the last years. 
This may create a more positive climate in the US towards reducing US subsidies. However, 
this is not exactly what happened in the outcome of this case. Despite there were some cuts in 
US subsidies, the vas amount of the cuts were promised to happen in the 2012 bill. Also, US 
actually ended up with subsidising Brazilian farmers, which suggests that the budget deficit 
was not a significant argument here. However, it is possible to imagine that the budget deficit 
made it seem more likely for Brazil that US will comply in the 2012 farm bill. As we 
                                                 
66
 The car lobby is discussed under 4.2.4. 
75 
 
remember, the promise to do this was a part of the 2010 framework. Thus the budget deficit 
may have increased the credibility of the US promise to comply in 2012, which might be one 
factor explaining why Brazil accepted that US did not comply fully. However, I have not 
found statements or other indicators suggesting this directly.  
All in all, I will argue that these factors connected to the timing – the financial crisis, the need 
for US to boost exports, the visit to Brasilia and the budget deficit, created a window of 
opportunity for Brazilian negotiators. This increased the effect of the Brazilian retaliation 
threat. This widened the US win-set, and can help explain why US went further in pleasing 
Brazilian interest after the retaliation threat.  
4.2.6 The use of synergistic linkage67  
I have not found that US or Brazil used synergistic linkage as a tool in this case. Thus it does 
not have seemed to affect the win-set. This corresponds with Evans‘s (1993) suggestion that 
synergistic linkage is unlikely to be a decisive factor. 
However, I note here that this might change with the discussion on the 2012 Farm bill which 
lies ahead. As mentioned, Congressmen Kind and Flake have argued that US farm policy 
ought to change due to that it is inconsistent with US‘ WTO obligations. If this argument 
reaches through, we might see a case of synergistic linkage.  
4.3 The international level  
 H6: The change in bilateral power relations between the two countries enhanced 
Brazil’s bargaining position. This was a factor for the change in US policy. 
A central starting point when analysing the processes in this case at the international level 
(level 1 in two-level games) is that the bilateral power relations between US and Brazil, if 
measured in economic (or in military) terms, are asymmetrical, as demonstrated in the 
discussion about the two countries‘ economies above. As showed in 2.2.1, Brazil is far more 
dependent on trading with US than US is on trading with Brazil. This illustrates how the 
political asymmetry is in US‘s favour. Thus in terms of classical realism, and neo-realist 
theories, the idea of Brazil inducing change in US policies can be a puzzle. Note however that 
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this would not be a puzzle if the change in US policies was not costly for the political leaders. 
But, as I have shown when discussing the power of the farmers‘ lobbies in US politics, it 
would be politically costly for the US negotiators to comply with the DSB reports of 2005 and 
2008. In this essay and in this internationally focused part of the analysis in particular, I will 
analyse the possible explanatory factors as to why a significantly less powerful country can 
induce change in the world‘s most powerful country. As Brazilian Agricultural Minister 
Reinhold Stephanes said in 2007, when commenting on the possibility of Brazilian retaliation: 
―It‘s very, very difficult to adopt measures against the United States (…). It is a big power 
and a big trading partner‖ (Bloomberg 2007). This illustrates how challenging it was for 
Brazil to induce change in US politics. 
However, the data on the bilateral relationship between US and Brazil (2.2.1) suggests that 
Brazil was less dependent on exporting goods to the US after the second than after the first 
DSB report. This suggests a bilateral power structure that is changing relatively between the 
two, possibly making Brazil‘s win-set smaller after the second compared to after the first 
report, increasing Brazil‘s bargaining power. This can help explain the change in US reactions 
to the DSB reports. Nevertheless, US is still a significant import and export partner for Brazil, 
so one should be careful to overestimate the effect this change can have had on the Brazilian 
win-set in the negotiations.  
The data also suggests that the US dependency on Brazil as a market for their goods has 
increased. This narrows the US win-set, as several US exporters have increasing interests in 
exporting to Brazil. In particular, this enhances the effect of the Brazilian post-2008 
retaliation threat, adding to the expansion of the US win-set this led to (see discussion about 
the Brazilian threat above and below). Nevertheless, US is still much more important as a 
trading partner for Brazil than Brazil is for US, and the power relation between them is still 
very much asymmetrical in favour of US. Thus, in terms of how dependent the two countries 
are on each other, Brazil‘s bargaining position is relatively weaker.  
I will now discuss what Brazil and US have done in order to make their own win-set smaller 
and not least, to make the opponent‘s win-set bigger. The last part of this discussion will use 
compliance theory and a discussion on the credibility and severity of the Brazilian threat – a 
discussion which has been touched upon already. This part will also discuss the possible 
relevance of Bachrach and Baratz‘s theory. But first I will discuss how parties have attempted 
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to influence their own win-sets, particularly through demonstrating a strong standing on the 
case.  
4.3.1 Making your own win-set smaller 
Influencing own win-set  
 H7: Throughout the process, both parties used statements and “window-dressing” to 
demonstrate commitment to the case (Putnam), thus narrowing their win-sets.  
A negotiator can influence its own win-set by demonstrating a strong stance on a case and 
rallying support at home. I will first discuss the Brazilian, then the US‘s, stance throughout 
the case. I will first show that Brazil had a continuously firm stance in the process, except 
perhaps towards the very end of the process leading up to the June 2010 Framework. 
Following Putnam‘s logic suggesting that commitment to the case can narrow the win-set, I 
argue that the strong Brazilian stance can have contributed to giving Brazil a strong 
bargaining position.  
Brazil has repeatedly and officially ―denounced unfair trading practices abroad‖, which 
according to Putnam is a typical way of narrowing your win-set. In 2006, Brazilian president 
Lula wrote about the need to eradicate agricultural subsidies, and US subsidies in particular, 
in the New York Times, arguing that they were ―not only immoral, but also illegal.‖ With a 
clear reference to the case of US cotton subsidies, Lula further argued that ―decisions taken by 
the World Trade Organization in the last few years – many in response to complaints brought 
by Brazil – have endorsed the view that subsidies profoundly distort international trade‖ 
(daSilva 2006). And in March 2010, when Brazil announced the goods it would retaliate 
against, Lula said: ―We want to show the US that it doesn‘t matter if you‘re big or small, or 
how much money you have as a nation (…) We all want to be respected and to be treated 
fairly‖ (Bloomberg 2010b). This demonstrates President Lula‘s commitment to the case.  
Rodrigues, the Agricultural Minister of Brazil, also stated early that he expected US to 
comply with the WTO ruling (Bloomberg 2005). The first Brazilian request to retaliate in 
2005 early demonstrated Brazil‘s commitment to the case, despite the fact that it did not lead 
to actual threat of retaliation (ICTSD 2005a; ICTSD 2005b).  
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Also, Brazilian officials have repeatedly referred to the case of West African cotton farmers, 
arguing that they suffered severely under the US subsidy scheme (BBC 2008). When referring 
to a case outside their own, Brazil seems to attempt to include moral arguments in the 
rhetoric, underlining their commitment to their case, and thus narrowing their win-set.  
After Brazil got the right to cross-retaliate in 2009, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim stated 
that they were ―going to choose the sectors that least affect us and most affect the US‖ 
(ICTSD 2009a). This was a repetition of the strong Brazilian stance on the case, and showed 
an intention to actually go through with the retaliation threat. This also pointed to that Brazil 
targeted vulnerable US goods, as discussed under 4.2. The credibility of the threat was 
increased by this.
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 In March 2010, after having released the first list of goods that would be 
subject to retaliation, Carlos Marcio Cozendey, head of economic affairs at Itamaraty (the 
Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs) repeated the strong stance: ―US farm subsidies are 
condemned worldwide. This archaic practice must stop‖ (BBC 2010).  
Further, Brazil released the list of proposed intellectual property sanctions (21 in total) earlier 
than they had said they would. The list was released on 15
th
 of March 2010, which was more 
than one week before they had announced (ICTSD 2010d). This suggests that Brazil wanted 
to signal a firm standing in the case, and that Brazil was serious in its intentions to retaliate. 
This could have made the Brazilian win-set smaller.  
However, after the threat of cross-retaliation, the Brazilian rhetoric changed, which I argue 
widened the Brazilian win-set. Right after Brazil released the IP sanctions list, the Brazilian 
Foreign Trade Chamber Secretary Lytha Spíndola signalled that they would be willing to 
cancel the retaliation on certain conditions. The conditions were that they wanted 
compensation to Brazilian cotton farmers based on their losses resulting from US subsidies, 
and a commitment to eliminate the illegal subsidies in the next farm bill (ICTSD 2010d). 
Interestingly, this is more or less identical to some of the key elements of the June 2010 
Framework. This strongly suggests that by opening up for the possibility of accepting US 
side-payments, Brazil widened its win-set in order to reach a deal.  
 Also, a paper released from the Brazilian CAMEX (the Brazilian Chamber of Commerce) on 
April 5
th
 2010, after the retaliation was postponed for the first time (in the first provisional 
agreement), included the following statement: ―The Brazilian Government understands that 
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ongoing bilateral discussions and the resulting provisional agreement may establish the basis 
for a future and final mutually satisfactory solution for the dispute.‖ (Itamaraty 2010b) And 
when the final deal of the Framework Agreement was reached between US and Brazil, 
Brazil‘s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim expressed satisfaction with the negotiation results, 
stating he believed that they would reach a mutual understanding (Itamaraty 2010c). This 
suggested that Brazil was more welcoming towards a possible compromise. This may have 
helped widen the win-set of Brazil and thus make an agreement between the parties easier. 
This can help explain why an agreement was reached.  
However, the Brazilians nevertheless expressed a clear expectation that US would eventually 
comply with the DSB recommendations in the 2012 US farm bill (Itamaraty 2010d). Brazil‘s 
WTO ambassador also expressed that they were expecting change in the farm bill: ―This is 
not a final solution, but it lays out elements that will allow for consultations and reforms to 
the farm bill that will take place by the end of 2012‖ (Robert Azevedo in Financial Times 
2010). Notably, he also underlined that Brazil still had the possibility to retaliate: ―Brazil 
doesn‘t rule out taking countermeasures at any moment‖ (Financial Times 2010). This was a 
reminder that Brazil still had the power to retaliate, narrowing their win-set.  
US had a relatively firm position throughout the case, repeatedly denying being in non-
compliance, and arguing that the measures taken to comply have been sufficient. After the 
2005 report, Brazil as well as African countries and NGO Oxfam urged US to comply 
immediately with the report‘s findings. However, the response of the US representative was 
measured, repeating a longstanding US position saying that ―the Bush administration was 
considering all options, and that negotiation, not litigation, was the most effective way to 
address the issue of subsidies in the WTO‖ (ICTSD 2005c). This was supported when US 
officials said on March 15
th
 2005 that they preferred resolving the cotton case through trade 
negotiations in the Doha round rather than in a settlement with Brazil (Schnepf 2010a: 15). 
By this, US stated quite clear opposition to the finding of the panel. Further, US agricultural 
secretary Mike Johanns stated in July 2007 that the government would ―work very, very hard‖ 
to uphold the cotton subsidies. And in the passing of the US 2008 farm bill, the Congress 
confirmed the strong stance on subsidies (ICTSD 2008b). I argue that this US stance after the 
2005 report, contributed to making the US win-set smaller.  
US kept their strong stance also after the second part of the dispute. When appealing the 
findings of the compliance panel, the USTR spokeswoman Gretchen Hamel argued that ―the 
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changes made by the United States have brought its programs into full compliance with the 
WTO‘s recommendations and rulings in the original Cotton case. (…) The appeal challenges 
the [DSB compliance panel‘s] erroneous findings on both U.S. support payments and export 
credit guarantees‖ (USTR 2008).69 Thus the USTR firmly opposed the compliance panel‘s 
findings, as well as Brazil‘s arguments of US non-compliance. As US demonstrated this 
strong stance also when the second part of the process (the compliance panel process) had 
started, this showed no indication of increased willingness to meet Brazil‘s demands, and thus 
no widening of the US win-set from the point of view of the US trade representative.  
However, after Brazil was authorised retaliation rights, the tone changed somewhat from the 
USTR spokesperson: ―While we remain disappointed with the outcome of this dispute, we are 
pleased that the Arbitrators awarded Brazil far below the amount of countermeasures it asked 
for‖ (USTR 2011). One reason for the change of tone might be that USTR indeed was more 
pleased with the WTO-authorised retaliation measure. However, it can also suggest US 
opened up for changing US cotton policies.  
To sum up: both US and Brazil seem to have changed the tone in official statements after the 
Brazilian cross-retaliation threat, which can have contributed to a wider win-set for both 
parties, opening up for an agreement. However, I will argue this change of tone also can be 
due to other factors that have influenced the case. For example, it is likely that the Brazilian 
retaliation threat affected the diplomatic communication between the countries, which again 
can have affected the official statements referred to here. Thus I will not overstate the 
importance of this change, as it may be a spurious, intermediate variable, due to an effect 
which is accounted for by other factors discussed in this thesis. 
Making your own win-set seem smaller than it is 
H 7.1: The parties attempted to make their own win-set seem smaller than they were, in order 
to better their bargaining position. 
In 2005, after having missed the deadline of changing the Step 2 subsidy program, the US 
trade representative Bob Portman said that the delay was partly due to the Katarina Hurricane 
(Bloomberg 2005). By this statement, Portman suggested that it was extra difficult for US to 
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comply at this particular point in time. This can have been an attempt to make the US win-set 
seem smaller than it was. However, I have not found data suggesting that Portman‘s claim 
was untrue. Neither have I found data suggesting that this particular statement had significant 
effect on the process. 
After Brazil released the list of US goods on which higher import duties would be imposed, 
the Itamaraty released a statement which creates an impression that Brazil sees the retaliation 
threat as being absolutely necessary.  
―The Brazilian Government regrets having to take these measures, since it believes that trade retaliation does not 
constitute the most appropriate means to attain international trade on a fairer basis. However, after almost 8 years 
of litigation and over 4 years of continuing non-compliance with the rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body on 
the part of the United States, and in absence of the offering of concrete and realistic options that could allow for 
the negotiation of a satisfactory solution to the dispute, it remains for Brazil to exercise its right, as authorised by 
the WTO‖ (Itamaraty 2010). 
Brazil created an impression of the retaliation threat to be inevitable, and thus confirmed that 
they intended to go forward with the threat if US did not comply. This decreased their win-
set, and perhaps enhanced the credibility of their threat, as Brazil clearly expressed that the 
threat is exercised as the least among evils. However, it is uncertain whether Brazil had 
actually carried through with the retaliation in the case of a non-agreement. If Brazil had not 
carried the sanctions through, the impression given by the above statement that retaliation was 
more or less inevitable, was false. If this was the case, Brazil here understated the size of its 
win-set. Perhaps more important, this statement contributed to the credibility of the threat, 
discussed below.  
In order to create an impression that your win-set is smaller than it is, it is a condition that the 
opponent has imperfect knowledge about your win-set. However, I have not found data which 
allows me to argue that US abused Brazilian lack of knowledge, or opposite. This weakens 
the possibility that the tactic of making your win-set look smaller than it is was an important 
factor for the outcome of this case.  
I argue that both US and Brazil attempted to make their win-sets seem ―kinky‖. In other 
words, an agreement is likely, but not if it is altered too much in the favour of the opponent. 
Both parties have had a firm stance in the case. US has been negative to the panel‘s findings, 
arguing that their subsidies have been legal. They have also referred to the need to go through 
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domestic procedures, and in particular the process of the farm bill.
70
 Brazil created an image 
that they would not yield from the case almost no matter what, and repeatedly stating that 
they were willing to retaliate, despite the costs. On the other hand, both parties appeared more 
reconciliatory when the deal was about to be closed. This can suggest that the parties made 
their respective win-sets just about large enough to reach a deal, thus attempting the strategy 
of ―kinky‖ win-sets.  
4.3.2 Expanding the opponents’ win-set 
Use of side payments  
 H8: Side-payments in the form of retaliation expanded US’s win-set, which was a 
decisive factor for change 
Both the Brazilian threat of retaliation and the US payment to Brazilian farmers constitute 
side payments. Through the latter, US made the Brazilian win-set bigger. Through the former, 
Brazil made it less attractive for Americans not to set a deal on the dispute with Brazil – thus 
they made the US win-set of an agreement relatively bigger. I will use compliance theory to 
expand on this point.  
The management school 
 H8.1: Reputation and international norms (the management school) were not decisive 
factors for the change in US policy. 
If the assumptions of the management school are right, one could expect US to comply with 
WTO rules even before Brazil issued a case in 2002. The fact that US didn‘t comply at this 
point suggests that reputation costs or norms were not enough to induce compliance in this 
case, and that enforcement mechanisms was needed. However, ambiguity in the agreement 
could be a possible explanation for non-compliance. In that case, however, one would expect 
US to comply right after the 2005 DSB recommendations. The fact that US was found to not 
be in compliance even after the 2005 report and DSB recommendations, suggests further that 
reputational costs or norms were insufficient to make US comply in this case.  
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It must be noted, however, that US did make some changes after the 2005 report
71
. This 
indicates that reputation and the legal texts and norms in themselves may have had some 
impact on US behaviour. However, I have not found data suggesting that reputation was the 
reason for this changed. And as Brazil chose to take the case further in the DSB process, and 
as the change was not found to bring US into compliance, this suggests that these factors did 
not suffice.  
The Brazilian agricultural minister Roberto Rodrigues seemed to try to influence the US 
stance by arguing with possible negative consequences for the US reputation after the 2005 
report: ―How are we going to discuss the future of world commerce, including agriculture, if 
an important member doesn‘t comply with a recent WTO decision?‖ (Bloomberg 2005) In 
this way Rodrigues linked compliance in this case to United States‘ credibility in the ongoing 
Doha trade talks. However, Doha was already experiencing a stalemate at this point (The 
Economist 2006). US, under the leadership of the Bush administration, had already managed 
to build up a bad reputation in the Doha round (Financial Times 2006). Thus it may be likely 
that US did not see that they had much to lose in worsening their reputation in WTO.  
I argue that norms and reputation were insufficient to induce compliance in this case. I will 
now discuss if enforcement mechanisms were sufficient to induce compliance, and whether 
the enforcement mechanisms were credible and severe enough to induce change in US. I will 
argue that the threats scored highly on both credibility and that they were sufficiently severe. 
The compliance school 
 H8.2: Brazil’s retaliation threats were credible and efficient (the compliance school), 
which widened the US win-set.  
The compliance school suggests that enforcement is necessary when it is costly for a state to 
comply. The fact that US did not comply with the ruling before Brazil initiated the DSB case, 
suggests that this was the case in the US-Brazil bargain on cotton subsidies. The enforcement 
mechanism should be sufficiently severe. I will now discuss whether Brazil‘s threats were 
sufficiently severe and credible. 
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After the 2005 report, Brazil did not threaten to sanction against US. Brazil did threaten with 
requesting sanctions, but struck a deal with US before they got the permission. Brazil‘s 
motivation for this might have been that they hoped sanctions would not be necessary. Other 
motivations may have been that they wanted the case to go through a compliance panel, or, 
that they hoped for significant change in the 2008 farm bill. Independent of the motivation, 
however, enforcement was not in play after the 2005 report.  
After the 2008 report enforcement was a factor. It is this period which will be discussed in 
detail here. If Brazil‘s 2010 threat to retaliate induced change in the US, it is undoubtedly a 
case of a country expanding a win-set in another country through trade sanctions. After Brazil 
had issued a list of retaliation on goods, economist Gary Hufbauer said the following, 
indicating that Brazil attempted to change the US domestic coalition: ―Brazil has decided that 
the only way to shift congressional [my italics] opinion is through retaliation‖ (The 
Economist 2010b).  
So, how decisive was the Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation as a factor for change in US? 
Based on compliance school theory, I assume that if Brazil‘s threats were viewed as credible 
and effective by US, it is likely that the threats affected US policies. I will start with 
discussing the credibility of the threat, and then discuss its efficiency.  
The retaliation is here controlled by the regime –WTO – and the offended country – Brazil. 
Brazil is not dependent on cooperation from US to complete the sanctions, as it can sanction 
regardless of what US does. Both these elements enhance the credibility of the threat, 
according to the compliance school. Also, as the retaliation method and amount is settled by 
the WTO Arbitrator, this minimizes the political influence, so that neither Brazil nor US 
decided how the retaliation should be. This enhances credibility. Also, as Brazil was less 
dependent on trade with US than earlier, the credibility of the threat increased.  
Ideally, the country imposing the retaliation should not be hurt by the sanctions. This is not 
the case here, as Brazilian consumers get more expensive US consumer goods and thus are 
hurt. On the other hand, the WTO arbitrator opened up for the possibility of parallel imports 
on certain products under TRIPS.
72
 This gains Brazilian consumers again, which increases the 
credibility of the threat. Also, imposing duties on US goods may boost the market of 
competing Brazilian goods within the same sector. 
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And indeed, Brazil was given the right to cross-retaliate only because retaliation on goods 
could harm Brazilian consumers and the Brazilian economy (ICTSD 2009a). The retaliation 
would then not be effective, and probably not credible, as US may doubt that Brazil would 
risk the damages on their economy. Cross-retaliation, on the other hand, ―does not trigger 
some of the adverse effects such as increased consumer prices caused by higher tariffs or 
greater costs for domestic producers who may be obliged to switch to other suppliers‖ 
(ICTSD 2009a). Cross-retaliation can make weaker countries less hurt by introducing 
retaliatory measures and thus increasing the likelihood that they indeed will implement the 
sanctions, and thus the credibility of the threat. That Brazil was allowed to retaliate under 
TRIPS enhanced this credibility, as e.g. pharmaceuticals became cheaper for Brazilian 
consumers, by allowing Brazilian companies to produce copies of US products 
(pharmaceuticals), products that normally were protected by US patents. It also enhanced the 
efficiency of the threat, as argued below. Here we see how level 2-elements, the domestic 
Brazilian economy, affect the credibility of the Brazilian threat. The authorisation from WTO 
to cross-retaliate contributed significantly to the power of the Brazilian threat. In this way also 
institutional factors played in: The possibility in the WTO rules to authorise this tool balanced 
the asymmetrical power between the two parties. 
One thing that enhances the credibility of trade retaliation compared to enforcement within 
other agreements (e.g. climate mitigation) is that it can be in the enforcing country‘s interest 
to retaliate.  This is indeed the case here – Brazil retaliates in the interest of its own economy, 
through the interest of the cotton exporters.  
The punishment is not automatic, which would have made the retaliation even more credible. 
Neither is it pareto-optimal
73
. The reason for this is that the global economy in sum suffers 
from increased duties. This slightly weakens the credibility of the threat. However, taken 
together, I argue that these factors suggest that sanctions in this case score high on credibility. 
The reactions within US industry, like the car industry, and from the politicians suggest that 
the threat indeed seemed credible.  
Was the threat effective? A first criterion is that non-compliance should be identified quickly. 
It is difficult to argue that this was the case here. The case was initiated in 2002 and the 
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compliance panel‘s appellate body report came in 2008. Thus it took as much as six years 
until the final recommendations were adopted by the DSB.   
However, perhaps more relevant for efficiency is what happens after identification of non-
compliant behaviour. So, after retaliation is allowed by WTO: how effective is then the 
system? This is the perhaps most important point of efficiency: Punitive consequences should 
be sufficiently severe. It should not be profitable to be in non-compliance. The fact that Brazil 
was allowed to cross-retaliate, made retaliation affect more sectors, making the consequences 
more severe, and more expensive for US.
74
  
And through this cross-retaliation threat, the international and domestic levels of two-level 
games interacted. ―By lifting patent and trademark protection on pharmaceutical products and 
software – rather than simply raising tariffs on imported goods – Brazil could spur US 
domestic interests to pressure Washington to comply with the original ruling‖ (ICTSD Sep 9 
2009a). This sentence illustrates how the domestic US level interplayed with the Brazilian 
retaliation, and more precisely, it illustrates how Brazil used the cross-retaliation/side-
payments to influence the US domestic coalition.
75
 This made the threatened sanctions more 
severe and therefore contributed significantly to the efficiency of the threat.  
The interplay with the financial crisis is highly relevant here. For more discussion on this, see 
4.2.5. Here it should suffice to say that several economic factors increased the efficiency of 
the threat. 
That the cross-retaliation tool, and particularly expanding it to intellectual property, increases 
the severity of the retaliation threat, is confirmed by professor of international trade and 
finance at Harvard Kennedy school, Robert Z. Lawrence: ―Traditionally, retaliation in trade 
has been the preserve of the largest developed countries, which have market power (…). But 
this mechanism – suspending intellectual property protection – gives smaller, developing 
countries a way to enforce their rights under trade rules‖  (New York Times 2010). This 
illustrates how this mechanism, aided by the international body WTO, can increase the 
relative severity of retaliation and then increase the power of a nation. The way this changed 
the win-sets of Brazil and US in Brazil‘s advantage, is, one of the key explanatory factors for 
the change in US policy.  
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A part of the Framework deal of June 2010 was that Brazil did not yield its rights to impose 
sanctions on US goods. Brazil can, if unsatisfied with the negotiations/US actions, break out 
of the Framework deal and then, retreat to sanctions (WTO 2010c). Thus there is a constant 
threat of Brazilian sanctions, worthy of more than USD 800 million. And it has been argued 
that this ongoing retaliation threat strengthened the Brazilian negotiating position (ICTSD 
2010c). Notably, already in the April 6
th
 2010 preliminary agreement US gave in on important 
points. And the fact that Brazil can resume the threat whenever, gives Brazil a strong card in 
the negotiations, increasing their potential of a narrower the win-set. Thus the sanctions ―in 
theory, at least – remain[s] a viable threat‖ (ICTSD 2010a). This ongoing retaliation threat 
can be important for Brazil, and it can explain why Brazil accepted the US promise of change 
in the 2012 Farm Bill, in stead of insisting on immediate compliance. 
Reverberation  
 H8.3:Reverberation (Putnam) was used to widen the win-set 
I have here chosen to understand reverberation as not including side-payments and retaliation, 
which has been thoroughly discussed in the above paragraphs. I believe that both Brazil and 
US attempted reverberation, however, with mixed effect.  
Brazil distributed the publications of the lists of retaliation measures over time. The first list, 
over goods, was issued March 8
th
 2010. In the statement following this, the Itamaraty 
announced that the next list would be released March 23
rd
, and this would be a list of 
retaliation measures ―related to intellectual property and other rights‖ (Itamaraty 2010).  In 
the same statement Brazil announced that the sanctions on goods would enter into effect 30 
days after the list was announced (Itamaraty 2010). Brazil indicated by this that they had 
more, and stronger, cards to play. This can have made the threat seem more severe than it 
was, and may have created insecurity among US producers. By this, it seems like Brazil 
attempted to expand the opponents‘ win-set. This suggests that Brazil attempted to expand the 
opponent‘s win-set through reverberation.  I do not have data suggesting that this was crucial 
in influencing US, however, it may have added to the effect of the retaliation threat, and the 
resulting widening of the US win-set.  
US also seems to have attempted reverberation. In 4.2.4 it was mentioned that the USTR 
warned that a possible retaliation from Brazil could deter US investment in the country. This 
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can have been an attempt to influence the Brazilian constituency to withdraw their support of 
Brazil‘s retaliation. However, analysts argued that these measures would not be exercised by 
the US as US was not keen on losing it influence in the region (ICTSD 2010b). This was 
particularly the case as China had surpassed US as Brazil‘s largest trading partner. Thus the 
international power structures changed. US was dependent on Brazil as a partner, particularly 
when it lost influence relative to competitors on the global scene. This made the US win-set 
smaller in terms of how drastic measures US would wish to oppose on Brazil. This weakened 
the US attempt to reverberate. It does not seem that the US reverberation attempt was decisive 
for the outcome.  
Decisions and non-decisions  
 H9: Authority (Bachrach and Baratz) was a factor in the change in US policy 
From the analysis above, I conclude that the retaliation threat had an impact. However, can 
some of the factors besides power, suggested by Bachrach and Baratz, have hade an impact?  
First: to what extent were the conditions of A (here: Brazil) to have power over B (US) met in 
this case? First: I assume that US knew what Brazil expected them to do both after the 2005 
report and after the 2008 report. This assumption is based on the fact that WTO DSB had 
issued recommendations, which was given to both parties and issued officially. What Brazil 
has pressured for throughout the case, is compliance with these recommendations. Second: 
the retaliation threatened by Brazil was indeed viewed by US as deprivation, as it included 
severe duties on important US industries. This is argued above. Power is also dependent on 
that value of sanctions is larger than the value of non-compliance, and that the threat is 
credible. As argued above, both these conditions are met in this case. I thus argue that Brazil 
had power over US.  
However, authority might have been at play. If that was the case, US did not comply only due 
to threat, but because it recognised the reasoning behind Brazil‘s (or, WTO‘s) order. Here the 
abovementioned change from the Bush to the Obama administration‘s responsiveness to 
international principles may have had an impact: With the Obama administration, the 
reasoning behind the case, might have had more impact on US policy, thus widening the US 
win-set. However, as argued above, I do not see the change in administration as likely to have 
been decisive for the outcome, as the main change came after Brazil‘s retaliation threat, and 
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not after the change in administration. Also, I have not found data explicitly suggesting that 
authority was a factor in the change in US policy. 
The relevance of the case in a broader context 
Already in 2004, after the very first report
76
, this case was regarded as having wide possible 
impacts. One is that it would strengthen the case for reducing subsidies of the developed 
countries in general. This again, can have repercussions for the Doha round, as the subsidies 
are one of the crucial issues stalling the talks – it was in 2004, and it still is a compelling 
issue. Also, the possible repercussions for other cotton producers – in particular, the four 
West African countries that were third party in the case – were of the development 
organisation Oxfam viewed as adding to the impacts of the case (ICTSD 2004). The West-
African cotton-exporting nations Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali have been third parties 
in the case as a possible reduction in US cotton subsidies could have consequences for their 
cotton export (OECD 2006). Thus the broader issues have been lying underneath throughout 
the process, which might have given the case enhanced weight in terms of authority and moral 
argument. However, these wider repercussions do not seem to have changed from after the 
2005 report to after the 2008 report, and I can therefore not see that it constitutes a decisive 
factor for answering my research question. And also, Brazil accepting the US side-payments 
suggested that they did not weigh in the situation of other cotton-exporters as a significant 
factor. 
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Based on my analysis, I will now conclude, answering the research question:  
What can explain the change in US policy vis-à-vis Brazil in the WTO case on cotton 
subsidies? 
I argue that I have found support for my main hypothesis: The Brazilian threat of cross-
retaliation was a necessary, but not sufficient factor to explain the change in US policies as 
asked for in the research question. It acted together with other factors.  
The Brazilian threat of cross-retaliation was indeed decisive for the change in US policies in 
this case. Through the possibility of issuing cross-retaliation, the WTO could authorise Brazil 
a method of enhancing its relative power vis-à-vis a stronger opponent. The threat was also 
credible and effective. However, the effect of cross-retaliation was dependent on several other 
factors.  
I argue that US changed their policies more positively towards Brazilian interests due to that 
the Brazilian threats were strengthened by a window of opportunity in which economic 
factors, like the financial crisis, played in. Brazil targeted industries strategically, in order to 
hit where it hurt the most. Group coalescence between different US interest groups, and the 
power balance between agricultural groups and non-agricultural groups, strengthened the 
Brazilian threat.  I have, however, not found support for the hypothesis that change in the US 
domestic coalition was an important factor in the case.  
I also argue that there were factors that explain why US did not comply fully, why US issued 
side-payments to Brazil, and why Brazil accepted this. First and foremost, I argue this was 
due to the US domestic ratification procedure and US policy-making rules, the farm bill 
procedure in particular. There were factors suggesting that the US promise to change its 
policies were relatively credible. This was supported by the fact that Brazil kept its rights to 
retaliate. And not last, Brazilian cotton farmers had incentives to welcome the side-payments 
from US, which can explain why Brazil accepted these side-payments.  
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I will now explain these factors more systematically and in more detail, as I will conclude on 
each of the hypotheses listed in 3.5.3.  
I argue that the Brazilian cross-retaliation threat changed the importance of the case in US, as 
argued in H1. This factor explains how the threat affected US policies. After the first report, 
the possible losses for US of a non-agreement were not that large. Thus the win-set of US was 
smaller, and they had more bargaining strength. But after the second report, the Brazilian 
retaliation threat made it important for US politicians and a significant part of the 
constituency to reach a deal. This significantly widened the US win-set, and weakened the US 
bargaining position.  
I have not found data supporting H2: that a change between internationalists and nationalists 
in US was a factor in explaining the change in US policy. This was despite the change in US 
administration from after the first to after the second DSB report and the change in the US 
presidency in particular.  
I do argue that the US policy-making rules was a significant factor throughout the process, as 
suggested in H3.1. After the first report, Brazilian negotiators hoped for significant change in 
the 2008 farm bill, which widened the Brazilian win-set. This can help explain why US did 
not comply more with the first report. After the second report, the Brazilian acceptance of the 
US domestic procedures again widened the Brazilian win-set. This helps answer the research 
question, and in particular, the fact that Brazilians accepted side payments instead of 
immediate compliance.  
However, the electoral system and other institutional factors can not explain the change in US 
policy. Institutional factors can explain the close ties between farmers‘ groups and politicians 
in US. However, there are no incentives that there has been a change in these close ties. This 
is as expected in H3.2. 
My analysis has not found support for H4.1., which suggests that the domestic political 
coalition had an effect on the US win-set. This factor does not seem to have had any decisive 
effect on the US win-set, and thus the change in US policy.  
My analysis supports the statement in H4.2: The involvement of new interest groups after the 
cross-retaliation threat significantly contributed to increasing the US win-set. This can explain 
why US policies changed in the interest of Brazil. However, the power of the interest groups 
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in Brazil can also explain why Brazil accepted the side-payments, as these were issued to 
Brazilian cotton farmers. 
By the cross-retaliation threat, Brazil contributed to group coalescence in US. The interests of 
several interest groups in US were raised, and suddenly a broad array of groups had stakes in 
US cotton policy. Through this, the US win-set widened, and Brazil‘s bargaining position 
became better, as suggested in H4.3. 
The Brazilian threat was also enhanced by a window of opportunity, as suggested in H5. The 
financial crisis, increased US export interests, the fiscal deficit in US and increased 
unemployment were economic factors that contributed to this, and together widened the US 
win-set.  
Despite that US is still a far larger economy than Brazil, the change in the bilateral economic 
power relations between the two, and the fact that US got competition from other countries, 
bettered Brazil‘s bargaining position. This supports the statement in H6. This contributed to 
widening the US win-set and can explain why US went further in meeting Brazil‘s wishes.  
I argue that the parties, through statements and window-dressing, demonstrated commitment 
to the case, and by this, narrowed the win-set, as suggested in H7. However, I have also found 
that this changed after the Brazilian cross-retaliation threat. I argue that this was a factor in 
widening the win-sets of both countries slightly, opening up for an agreement. I also argue 
that the parties may have attempted to make their win-sets seem smaller than they were, as 
suggested in H7.1. However, I have not found data supporting that this had significant effect 
on the process. 
I have not found data suggesting that reputation and international norms were decisive factors 
for the change in US policy. This supports the notion expressed in H8.1. 
I argue that the threats from Brazil were both credible and efficient, which widened the US 
win-set, as suggested in H8.2. An important reason for this was that WTO authorised cross-
retaliation, not only ―regular‖ retaliation. The authorisation from WTO to cross-retaliate 
contributed significantly to the power of the Brazilian threat, and made Brazil significantly 
stronger.  In this way also institutional factors played in: WTO had the power to issue Brazil a 
tool which strengthened them, and which it would not otherwise have been possible for Brazil 
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to use. Together with the other factors mentioned here, this was essential in widening the US 
win-set enough to reach an agreement which was more along the lines of Brazilian interests.  
I argue that reverberation was attempted to use. However, I have not found data supporting 
the notion expressed in H8.3 that this widened the win-set significantly. 
Authority may have been present in this case. However, I have not found data supporting H9 
in that this was a factor in changing US policy.  
Implications and future research  
The Brazil-US dispute over US cotton subsidies has been followed closely by other countries, 
the West African cotton-exporters in particular. During the process of the case, Brazil referred 
to the interests of C4 in order to support the argument that this case was about more then 
Brazil. However, when it came down to signing an agreement with US, the analysis here 
suggests that the Brazilian domestic interests were decisive for the outcome, as the Brazilian 
cotton industry now receives significant side-payments. This led to a situation in which the 
C4 are almost worse off than earlier: Now US is not only subsidising US farmers, but 
Brazilians too! We can expect C4 to continue to follow this case closely.  
However, the case is interesting for other smaller and developing countries as well: Is it 
possible for a developing country to challenge the world‘s largest economy in the WTO? 
This paper suggests that it is indeed possible, albeit given certain conditions. Despite strong 
resistance among powerful interests in the US, Brazil has through challenging the US cotton 
subsidies in the WTO DSB managed to induce some change in the US cotton subsidy 
programme. This happened despite the fact that Brazil is a far smaller economy than US. The 
outcome of the case suggests that cross-retaliation can have the intended effect – to help 
retaliation to work when relatively weaker countries challenge relatively stronger ones – 
however given certain conditions.  
If I am to suggest a hypothesis for future research, for other developing countries challenging 
stronger countries in WTO, I suggest the following: 
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Cross-retaliation is an instrument which can be an essential factor for strengthening the 
relative power of developing countries in the WTO DSB. However, how well the instrument 
works, is dependent on several factors besides the authorisation to cross-retaliate. 
A question for future research is therefore: What factors are needed in order make cross-
retaliation work in the WTO DSB for countries who wish to change politics in stronger 
countries?  
This case suggests what some of the factors can be. First, it helps to have an important 
strategic position like Brazil has for US in Latin-America. Second, a strengthened economic 
position relative to the target country contributes to a better bargaining position. Third, the 
timing of the retaliation is essential, in terms of what economic situation the opposing country 
is in. It helps if the target country is in an economically weak position. Fourth, targeting weak 
industries exacerbates the threat. Fifth, the balance between different interest groups in the 
target country plays in.  
As a finishing point, it is interesting to note the role of agricultural subsidies in the recent 
(April 2011) debate about the long-term cuts in the US budget. April 13
th
 2011, US President 
Barack Obama gave a speech laying out his plans for reducing the US budget deficit. A total 
of USD 4 trillion was proposed cut over 12 years (The Economist 2011). Obama‘s deficit 
commission called for a USD 10 billion cut in farm subsidies. Earlier this year, Republican 
Paul Ryan‘s deficit-reducing plan included a USD30 billion cut in farm subsidies (LJWorld 
2011).  
While both cuts are likely to stir opposition and debate, this can suggest that a future 
reduction in US farm subsidies indeed may happen. Then, perhaps, the cuts will be due to the 
need to reduce the US budget deficit more than anything else. However, in the case of cotton 
subsidy reduction in the Brazil-US dispute, we have seen that several other factors have been 
relevant. Factors at different levels work together in international trade negotiations, and are 
likely to do so in the future. For cotton exporting countries, it will be exciting to follow the 
future budget processes, and the farm bill process scheduled to happen in 2012.  
This recent statement by a US agricultural economist suggests that the Brazilian cotton 
subsidies case might become important for the farm bill: ―The major issue in resolving the 
WTO case is for the US to bring its policy into compliance in the 2012 farm bill‖ (American 
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Agriculturalist 2010). This suggests that the case is important to US, and not least, that the 
framework agreement does include reliable commitment for change in subsidies from the side 
of US. It will be interesting to see if Brazil will experience full US compliance with its WTO 
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